A firm’s creditors and stock holders are often both viewed as investors but in reality creditors are literally lending to stockholders, thus putting these two investors on opposite sides of the credit claim. Therefore, these two investors do not necessarily share the same objectives for the firm.
Stockholders, as owners of the firm, are entitled to the firm’s net income
after all expenses are paid. As the interest owed creditors is a business expense, stockholders can only claim the income of the firm after the creditors are paid. In other words, creditors’ claims have seniority over equity holders’ claims. This by itself can cause divergent incentives between the two claimants. Say, for example, the firm has to choose between a risky project with an uncertain high payoff and a safe project with a more certain marginal payoff. The return on the safe project may barely leave anything left over to
stockholders once creditors are paid. Therefore stockholders may favor the risky project over the safe one. Creditors, on the other hand, might be equally indifferent to both projects if both of them can cover the firm’s interest expense. Because creditors get their returns first, they may have less incentive to monitor managerial behavior than stockholders.