The legitimacy of North Korea’s hereditary power succession is based on its unique
political system, the so-called monolithic system (yooilcheje). A number of studies have
been written on the characteristics of North Korea’s political system, but no broad consensus
on the subject has been reached (Kim, 2006; Choi, 2001; Lee, 2001; Seo, 2000;
Oh, 2000; Kim, 1995; McCormack, 1993; Lee, 1991; Cumings, 1997; 1995; 1982).
Some call it a corporatist state system; others describe it as a fascist state system, a
guerrillaist state system, a suryeong (leader) system, a monarchical system, a theocratic
state system or a neo-totalitarian state system (Lee, 2001, pp. 115–22). All of these
arguments, however, point to one thing in common: unlike all other communist countries,
North Korea has established and maintained a monolithic system, which has
played a crucial role in enabling the continuing monopoly of power by a sole leader
(suryeong) and facilitating the hereditary succession of power from Kim Il-sung to his
son (Kim Jong-il) and then to his grandson (Kim Jong-un).
This monolithic system has the following features. First, it exhibits the highest level
of power concentration in the hands of one individual. Under the monolithic system,
social revolution and construction are carried out based solely on the ideology of the
suryeong and at his command and direction; the political party, the people and
the whole nation act as one body under the guidance of the suryeong. Accordingly, the
suryeong himself is at the apex or core of the system (Lee, 2001, p. 210). Following
Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime 5
the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, his son, Kim Jong-il, took on the role of suryeong,
and since the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, his son, Kim Jong-un, has taken on that
role. Second, under the monolithic system, the whole society is mobilised and militarised
with the aim of replicating the power of the suryeong. The suryeong drives his
country towards a militaristic, communist “ideal” by enforcing the routine instillation
of the military spirit at all times and at all levels of society. Third, under the monolithic
system, a discourse to rationalise the power of the suryeong is developed along with a
wide range of social organisations to reproduce the patterns of the suryeong’s behaviour.
Finally, the monolithic system is usually accompanied by a cult of personality.
This includes exaggerated compliments directed at the suryeong’s genius and achievements,
the dissemination of moral tales featuring the suryeong through the media and
school education, the preservation of sites associated with the suryeong’s activities, and
the marking of the leaders’ birthdays as the country’s most important national holidays
(Lee, 2001, p. 210).
The construction of the monolithic system started in earnest in the 1960s when the
purge of all Kim Il-sung’s opponents was completed and Juche ideology came to the
fore as a political ideology to facilitate the establishment of the monolithic system.
Juche literally means the “main body”, “subject”, “independent stand” or “spirit of
self-reliance”.
2 It was originally developed as a political slogan to symbolise North
Korea’s rejection of the Soviet Union’s policy of de-Stalinisation in the mid-1950s. In
a speech delivered in April 1965, Kim Il-sung (1965) outlined the three fundamental
principles of Juche – “independence in politics” (jaju), “self-sufficiency in the
economy” (jarip), and “self-reliance in national defence” (jawi). He thus implied that
the North Korean people must have independence in thought and politics, economic
self-sufficiency, and self-reliance in defence, and that state policy must reflect the
will of the masses. In this respect, the concept of Juche is apparently akin to a
human-oriented philosophy. It soon developed into a system that decreed that the
masses, in order to fulfil their duty, must submit to the guidance of the suryeong. In
this way, a human-oriented philosophy was systematically converted into a
suryeong-oriented philosophy, which later became a crucial part of “Kimilsungism”.
In 1986, the theory of the “sociopolitical organism” was developed and added to the
Juche ideology; according to this theory, the suryeong, the ruling party and the masses
are one organic body, with the suryeong representing the brain. This theory was further
developed into the “blood” theory, whereby ideological foundations were provided for
the construction of an organic system, in which the party, the whole nation and
the masses act as one body in accordance with the suryeong’s directions. In 1992, the
Juche concept’s remaining connections to Marxism were completely removed from the
North Korean Constitution, and Juche was elevated to the status of a kind of religious3
and moral system, which ultimately defined the purpose of people’s lives, thereby
providing the ideological justification for the hereditary succession of power from Kim
Il-sung to his son, Kim Jong-il, and then to his grandson, Kim Jong-un. North Korea
thus possesses all of the characteristics of a monolithic system, with Juche being
developed as a logical tool to rationalise it.
In the meantime, Juche, in that it advocates resistance to political subordination or
economic domination, has directly or indirectly given rise to a unique economic
development strategy in North Korea. It is aimed at building up a self-reliant economic
system, under which reproduction would always be made possible through the mobili-
6 Yong Soo Park
sation of human and material resources at home and the expansion of the domestic
market. This development strategy has played a pivotal role in holding back the
development of foreign trade and the adoption of foreign technologies. Despite North
Korea’s lack of capital, its leadership has continued to disregard the concept of comparative
advantage, a dominant principle in international trade, and concentrated on heavy
industrial production.
Under the monolithic system, economic considerations have been completely disregarded
and the nation’s investment priorities have been significantly distorted. In other
words, economic efficiency has been subordinated to political goals and the prestige of
the suryeong has been given priority over everything else in North Korea. For example,
projects that promote the prestige of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and North Korea’s
national independence, such as the Juche Idea Tower, the Triumphal Arch and the Kim
Il-sung Stadium in Pyongyang, and the hosting of big international events such as the
1989 Pyongyang International Youth Festival,4 have been given the highest priority in the
national budget. The mobilisation of large crowds for extreme suryeong worship campaigns,
which have increased in frequency since the mid-1960s, is also an example of
politics being put before economics in order to reinforce the monolithic system. This kind
of policy is a primary reason for the continuing slump in the North Korean economy.
Once it reaches a certain level of development, a nation needs endogenous growth in
order to jump to the next level. Under the monolithic system, however, the North
Korean economy has been constructed in such a way as to make it suited to a speedy
battle through the mobilisation of ideology and social institutions. This development
strategy has drained individuals of their personality and creativity, making it almost
impossible to achieve the technological innovation necessary for endogenous
development (Lee, 2001, pp. 348–49).
The North Korean monolithic system has also had a negative impact on the country’s
reforms and opening up. Firstly, the monolithic system has been maintained primarily by
controlling information and isolating the people from the outside world, both to prevent
them from comparing North Korea with other countries and to maintain a sense of hostility
toward the outside world in order to reinforce internal unity (Ha, 2004, p. 138). The
isolationism inherent in the monolithic system has greatly hindered the introduction of
elements of a market economy and openness, both of which emphasise transparency. Furthermore,
one of the basic characteristics of the monolithic system is its unitary nature, as
evidenced by the North Korean leaders’ public rejection of political pluralism and the
multi-party system (Lee, 2001, p. 349). Under such a unitary system, all thoughts and
ideas must come from the suryeong and hence the whole nation takes the form of a series
of concentric circles, with the suryeong positioned at the centre. The kind of pluralism
that usually results from opening up to the outside world would inevitably pose a serious
threat to this unitary system. This is the primary reason that the North Korean leadership
has been so unwilling to open up the country to the outside world.
Given the present political circumstances in North Korea, where the monolithic
system and Juche ideology are still upheld firmly and consistently, it is perhaps no
wonder that the bold policy initiatives necessary for comprehensive reforms and
opening up by the new regime are almost impossible. It remains to be seen how much
longer North Korea’s monolithic system and Juche ideology will last, but it is now
clear that as long as North Korea adheres to them, it has little chance of successfully
carrying out significant reforms.