Trespass to the person The state of mind of the defendant Assuming that the plaintiff is directly affected by the defendant's voluntary act, four inportane uestions arise as to the state of mind of the defendant required the tort of trespass to the person
(a) Where the conduct is said to be'intentional', what is it that the defendant must intend? Students are often unclear on this naster Where the plaintiff alleges an intentional battery, what he must show is that the defendant intended the contact it is not necessary t show that the defendant intended the harmful consequence(if any) which flowed from the contact. See Williams v Humpbrey(1973
(b) What precisely amounts to intentional' contact context? Contact which the defendant desired will certainly be intentional, as will contacts which are undesired but which are on the facts substantially certain to result from the defendant's conduct. Whilst there appear to be no modern cases covering preciseby this latter point on battery, the decision in Wilkinson v Dosaston(1897m(above) arguably supports that view. Students will recognise this case as one in which a practical joke went wrong, of the untrue statement made by the defendant practical joker(that the plaintiffs husband had been injured in an accident), Wright J said"It is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with aparent seriousness, could fail produce grave and intention to such an effect must be imputed. Recklessness may also be sufficient to found a civil action in assault or battery, though again there is a dearth of authority directly in point reckless act may be treated as an act) even though contact may not be desired nor substantially certain ro result from the defendant's conduct, if the defendant knows that contact may well result from his actions and carries on taking the risk, nor caring whether the contact occurs, he may be liable in battery. The absence in civil law of a doctrine of malice could make the issue of recklessness important in an action in trespass. Beware, therefore, of examination questions in which, for strike another example, blows or objects thrown at one person a be liable in battery where an unintentinnal bo
(c)Can Thoug Begligent act causes direct contact with another person? only there is some authority for the proposition that trespass esn committed by intentional conduct(including recklewness), it cantor regarded as finally settled. (See Street Danckwerts P 15. eda, According to Lord MR(with whom in Letang v Cooper l1965l 1 QB 232 at p. 240, where the condaa
Trespass to the person The state of mind of the defendant Assuming that the plaintiff is directly affected by the defendant's voluntary act, four inportane uestions arise as to the state of mind of the defendant required the tort of trespass to the person(a) Where the conduct is said to be'intentional', what is it that the defendant must intend? Students are often unclear on this naster Where the plaintiff alleges an intentional battery, what he must show is that the defendant intended the contact it is not necessary t show that the defendant intended the harmful consequence(if any) which flowed from the contact. See Williams v Humpbrey(1973(b) What precisely amounts to intentional' contact context? Contact which the defendant desired will certainly be intentional, as will contacts which are undesired but which are on the facts substantially certain to result from the defendant's conduct. Whilst there appear to be no modern cases covering preciseby this latter point on battery, the decision in Wilkinson v Dosaston(1897m(above) arguably supports that view. Students will recognise this case as one in which a practical joke went wrong, of the untrue statement made by the defendant practical joker(that the plaintiffs husband had been injured in an accident), Wright J said"It is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with aparent seriousness, could fail produce grave and intention to such an effect must be imputed. Recklessness may also be sufficient to found a civil action in assault or battery, though again there is a dearth of authority directly in point reckless act may be treated as an act) even though contact may not be desired nor substantially certain ro result from the defendant's conduct, if the defendant knows that contact may well result from his actions and carries on taking the risk, nor caring whether the contact occurs, he may be liable in battery. The absence in civil law of a doctrine of malice could make the issue of recklessness important in an action in trespass. Beware, therefore, of examination questions in which, for strike another example, blows or objects thrown at one person a be liable in battery where an unintentinnal bo
(c)Can Thoug Begligent act causes direct contact with another person? only there is some authority for the proposition that trespass esn committed by intentional conduct(including recklewness), it cantor regarded as finally settled. (See Street Danckwerts P 15. eda, According to Lord MR(with whom in Letang v Cooper l1965l 1 QB 232 at p. 240, where the condaa
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