System of sociology
Although Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887) established Tönnies’ reputation, his system of sociology is better studied in his later works, particularly those published after 1925. At this mature stage of his work Tönnies distinguished between a broad and a narrow concept of sociology. The former included social biology, demography, and social psychology, while the latter included only the study of social relationships, groups, norms, and values. Within the narrower field, Tönnies established three methodologically distinct divisions or levels of inquiry:
(1) Theoretical or pure sociology as an integrated system of basic concepts.
(2) Applied sociology, a deductive discipline that uses the concepts of theoretical sociology in order to understand and explain the origin and development of society, in particular modern society.
(3) Empirical sociology or sociography, the latter term coined by Rudolf Steinmetz (1935), which was never clearly defined by Tönnies but which corresponds roughly to what is called sociological research in the United States.
It was, of course, quite clear to Tönnies that these conceptual distinctions cannot be maintained in the study of concrete social phenomena. Empirical sociological research must be oriented toward a general theory of social interaction, and the physical existence and psychological interaction of men must be given recognition.
Social entities. T önnies perceived all social interactions and groups as creations of human thought and will. These creations he called social entities (soziale Wesenheiten), and he classified them roughly as social collectives (Samtschaften), social corporations (soziale Korperschaften), and social relationships (soziale Verhaltnisse). The concept of Samtschaft occurs only in Tönnies’ later writings and refers to those unorganized groups that are large enough to be independent of the participation of specific individuals, for example, social classes or the nation. The concept of social corporation is derived from the legal concept of persona iuris and refers to groups that are able to act through representative organs (officers). Social relationships may have their basis in biological or psychological relationships, or in both (as in the case of the relationship between parent and child), but as social relationships in the strict sense of the concept they exist because, and insofar as, they are recognized, acknowledged, and willed by the participants and, normally, also by outsiders (see Tönnies’ preface to the 6th and 7th editions of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). Social relationships in this sense involve the awareness of certain obligations and claims that are regulated by social norms or rules of conduct. They occur, of course, within social corporations and social collectives. The biological, psychological, and social levels of these relationships are independent: it is possible, for example, for a parent to disown his child or for a marriage to be maintained even though the psychological relationship between the spouses has become essentially hostile.
The identification of social entities with willed relationships distinguishes Tönnies’ concept of the social from that of behaviorism, which attributes to any kind of human interaction the quality of being social. According to Tönnies, a social entity is a creation of the will of its members, which has for them a quasi-objective reality, imposes upon them certain obligations, and grants them certain rights. These characteristics are most evident in social corporations, but they exist also in simple social relationships. The will to maintain a particular social relationship as a social entity is manifest when the participants conform to the specific rules of conduct valid for that relationship.