In a public choice framework, the national politicians assembled in the
Council must be assumed to maximize their power and prestige, their
ideological objectives and their amenities - all subject to the national
reelection constraint. To some extent, they can gain by furthering the public
interest, i.e., by acting in conformity with the normative theory of fiscal
federalism. To that extent, they are interested in internalizing Pareto-relevant
cross-border externalities, in exploiting international economies of scale in
the production of public goods and in removing governmental barriers to
trade and factor movements. While Council meetings in Brussels provide
prestige and amenities, international agreements, (qualified) majority
decisions and the transfer of competencies to the Community restrict the
freedom of discretion, and - prima facie - reduce the power, of the politicians
in the national governments. Why do they permit or even promote the
centralization of power in the Council?