One way to begin would be to ask the same generic questions asked of electoral representation, as suggested above: (a) How are the representatives authorized by those in whose name they act? (b) How are they held accountable by those they claim to represent? With respect to authorization, the nature of the representative agent will make a difference. Many self-authorized representatives are voluntary organizations with followings and memberships. In such cases, authorization might work through members’ votes and voices. Other kinds of self-authorized representatives make claims on behalf of ascriptive, involuntary constituencies, such as racial or ethnic groups (Alcoff 1991, Strolovitch 2006). Then there are agents who claim to represent those with little or no voice, such as international human rights organizations, or organizations representing the interests of children or animals. Finally, there are many agents—nongovernmental organizations and foundations,for example—who claim missions on behalf of others, more or less formally (Grant& Keohane 2005, Saward 2006b). In these kinds of cases, initial authorization is inherently problematic; agents claim representative status and it is up to those who are claimed as “represented” to say yes or no or to offer alternative accounts. Authorization is, as it were, reflexive and retrospective at best. Where those who are represented are silent because of their context—or absent, as in the case of future generations—the analogy to electoral authorization breaks down altogether,and we are better off to look at generic norms and functions of democratic representation, and then to imagine nonelectoral devices that might serve these norms and functions (Rubenstein 2007).
One way to begin would be to ask the same generic questions asked of electoral representation, as suggested above: (a) How are the representatives authorized by those in whose name they act? (b) How are they held accountable by those they claim to represent? With respect to authorization, the nature of the representative agent will make a difference. Many self-authorized representatives are voluntary organizations with followings and memberships. In such cases, authorization might work through members’ votes and voices. Other kinds of self-authorized representatives make claims on behalf of ascriptive, involuntary constituencies, such as racial or ethnic groups (Alcoff 1991, Strolovitch 2006). Then there are agents who claim to represent those with little or no voice, such as international human rights organizations, or organizations representing the interests of children or animals. Finally, there are many agents—nongovernmental organizations and foundations,for example—who claim missions on behalf of others, more or less formally (Grant& Keohane 2005, Saward 2006b). In these kinds of cases, initial authorization is inherently problematic; agents claim representative status and it is up to those who are claimed as “represented” to say yes or no or to offer alternative accounts. Authorization is, as it were, reflexive and retrospective at best. Where those who are represented are silent because of their context—or absent, as in the case of future generations—the analogy to electoral authorization breaks down altogether,and we are better off to look at generic norms and functions of democratic representation, and then to imagine nonelectoral devices that might serve these norms and functions (Rubenstein 2007).
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