Wittgenstein then asks us to consider an isolated individual, that is, consider in
relation to only her intrinsic features, and to say what makes it the case that her actions
are an instance of following, rather than merely conforming to, a rule.
The first thing to note is the rejection of the idea that the mere operation of an algorithm could suffice. To be following a rule is to be sensitive in some way to the
possibility of diverging from it and, hence, to be responsive to a norm for that activity.
Someone who robotically follows an algorithm cannot determine whether in fact that
algorithm is functioning correctly. Note that any attempt to avoid this problem via
the operation of a master algorithm that detects if the first is being applied correctly
just creates a vicious regress. What could make it the case that the second algorithm
was functioning as a norm rather than a mere mechanism? This regress argument
expands into a version of the ‘frame problem’ (Dreyfus, 1992), which is a serious challenge
to computational accounts of context-sensitive cognitive capacities. However
Bourdieu does not fight his battle with the legalists on that terrain (although perhaps
he should). Answering Wittgenstein’s question then becomes a matter of determining
what it is about an agent that constitutes this sensitivity to the possibility of error. It
cannot consist in overt behaviour because the problem is constituted by the fact that
there is no behavioural difference between mere conformity and actual understanding.
Nor can it consist in the mechanical operation of an algorithmic process.
Wittgenstein then goes on to show that the relevant sensitivity cannot consist in the
fact that the activity is caused or accompanied by ‘inner’ mental events, be they intentions,
construed as attitudes to propositions, or mental images. The short reason is that
nothing ‘inner’ (a conscious or unconscious mental process) or ‘outer’ (a physical event,
including a piece of behaviour, or object) bears a meaning intrinsically. In order to
function as a sign, a physical or mental process, object or state, must be interpreted. The
problem of making inner items meaningful is the same as that of making outer items
meaningful. Neither are self-interpreting and both get their meaning from their role in
a communicative practice. This is just as true of stop signs by the side of the road, or
texts in a library, as inner speech or imaginary episodes. Thus one cannot explain why
someone who sees a stop sign interprets that as an instruction to stop by saying that that
perceptual experience prompts the occurrence of an inner instruction to stop. What is
supposed to make it the case that the inner instruction, if such there is, bears that
meaning? Another inner instruction? And so on .
Wittgenstein then asks us to consider an isolated individual, that is, consider in
relation to only her intrinsic features, and to say what makes it the case that her actions
are an instance of following, rather than merely conforming to, a rule.
The first thing to note is the rejection of the idea that the mere operation of an algorithm could suffice. To be following a rule is to be sensitive in some way to the
possibility of diverging from it and, hence, to be responsive to a norm for that activity.
Someone who robotically follows an algorithm cannot determine whether in fact that
algorithm is functioning correctly. Note that any attempt to avoid this problem via
the operation of a master algorithm that detects if the first is being applied correctly
just creates a vicious regress. What could make it the case that the second algorithm
was functioning as a norm rather than a mere mechanism? This regress argument
expands into a version of the ‘frame problem’ (Dreyfus, 1992), which is a serious challenge
to computational accounts of context-sensitive cognitive capacities. However
Bourdieu does not fight his battle with the legalists on that terrain (although perhaps
he should). Answering Wittgenstein’s question then becomes a matter of determining
what it is about an agent that constitutes this sensitivity to the possibility of error. It
cannot consist in overt behaviour because the problem is constituted by the fact that
there is no behavioural difference between mere conformity and actual understanding.
Nor can it consist in the mechanical operation of an algorithmic process.
Wittgenstein then goes on to show that the relevant sensitivity cannot consist in the
fact that the activity is caused or accompanied by ‘inner’ mental events, be they intentions,
construed as attitudes to propositions, or mental images. The short reason is that
nothing ‘inner’ (a conscious or unconscious mental process) or ‘outer’ (a physical event,
including a piece of behaviour, or object) bears a meaning intrinsically. In order to
function as a sign, a physical or mental process, object or state, must be interpreted. The
problem of making inner items meaningful is the same as that of making outer items
meaningful. Neither are self-interpreting and both get their meaning from their role in
a communicative practice. This is just as true of stop signs by the side of the road, or
texts in a library, as inner speech or imaginary episodes. Thus one cannot explain why
someone who sees a stop sign interprets that as an instruction to stop by saying that that
perceptual experience prompts the occurrence of an inner instruction to stop. What is
supposed to make it the case that the inner instruction, if such there is, bears that
meaning? Another inner instruction? And so on .
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