We might well agree with the above analysis, and want to
get some distance from the Rousseauean model of citizen
dignity. Yet still we might want to know whether any politics
of equal dignity, based on the recognition of universal
capacities, is bound to be equally homogenizing. Is this true
of those models—which I inscribed above, perhaps rather arbitrarily,
under the banner of Kant—that separate equal freedom
from both other elements of the Rousseauean trinity?
These models not only have nothing to do with a general
will, but abstract from any issue of the differentiation of
roles. They simply look to an equality of rights accorded to
citizens. Yet this form of liberalism has come under attack by
radical proponents of the politics of difference as in some
We might well agree with the above analysis, and want to
get some distance from the Rousseauean model of citizen
dignity. Yet still we might want to know whether any politics
of equal dignity, based on the recognition of universal
capacities, is bound to be equally homogenizing. Is this true
of those models—which I inscribed above, perhaps rather arbitrarily,
under the banner of Kant—that separate equal freedom
from both other elements of the Rousseauean trinity?
These models not only have nothing to do with a general
will, but abstract from any issue of the differentiation of
roles. They simply look to an equality of rights accorded to
citizens. Yet this form of liberalism has come under attack by
radical proponents of the politics of difference as in some
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
