How do derivatives markets affect corporate decisions of financial intermediaries? I introduce interest rate swaps into the capital structure model of a bank. First, derivatives are a substitute to financial flexibility for risk management. Second, I show the existence of three distinct motives to engage in interest rate risk management. Together, they imply that both increases and decreases in the short rate can be optimally hedged. Third, the use of derivatives induces a “procyclical but asymmetric” lending policy. Derivatives users are better able to exploit transitory lending opportunities in good times, but do not cut lending proportionally more during either monetary contractions or real recessions. Finally, despite attractive insurance properties of derivative contracts, not all banks take derivative positions, as in the data. The model’s predictions jointly match a number of yet unexplained stylized facts. New testable predictions are obtained.
How do derivatives markets affect corporate decisions of financial intermediaries? I introduce interest rate swaps into the capital structure model of a bank. First, derivatives are a substitute to financial flexibility for risk management. Second, I show the existence of three distinct motives to engage in interest rate risk management. Together, they imply that both increases and decreases in the short rate can be optimally hedged. Third, the use of derivatives induces a “procyclical but asymmetric” lending policy. Derivatives users are better able to exploit transitory lending opportunities in good times, but do not cut lending proportionally more during either monetary contractions or real recessions. Finally, despite attractive insurance properties of derivative contracts, not all banks take derivative positions, as in the data. The model’s predictions jointly match a number of yet unexplained stylized facts. New testable predictions are obtained.
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