Finally, we consider three country-specific variables to control for the bank regulatory and supervision framework. The latter might have an effect on the incentives of bank managers to publish accurate reports, as well as the ones of auditors to detect and report any misstatements. As Lam and Mensah (2006) point out, audit opinions are issued in varying regulatory and legal environments, some with more risk to the auditor than in others. They also argue that, assuming that auditors in developed economics have similar ethical standards and training and apply the same global audit methodologies, their audit opinions even in identical business circumstances may vary due to differences in the regulatory and legal pressures faced. Prescott (2004) also argues that without adequate supervision and appropriate penalties a bank has not many incentives to report the true risks of its assets. Furthermore, it has been argued that flexibility in accounting standards leads to ambiguity in implementation (Bayless et al., 1996). Additionally, the existence of flexibility and subjectivity in accounting procedures and policy choices provides greater room for earnings management and heightens pressure for negotiation between management and the auditor on the application of appropriate GAAP ( Johl et al., 2003).