By 1958 the strains in Sino-Soviet relations came to a head, in part because of Mao’s anxieties about his country’s psychological as well as material dependency on the Soviet Union, combined with the deep-seated differences over international strategy. In April Khrushchev had proposed negotiating a nuclear test ban with the Americans that aroused Chinese resentment at this apparent move against their acquiring a nuclear capability. At a crucial meeting in the summer, Mao summarily rejected Khrushchev’s suggestion to establish a joint fleet together, with joint naval and air communications facilities in China. Not long after that meeting, Mao initiated the second offshore island crisis by bombarding Quemoy in the apparent expectation of forcing the Taiwan garrison to surrender ‘without an American response, thereby demonstrating to Khrushchev Peking’s resolve, Washington’s impotence, and Moscow’s irrelevance’. But Mao had to back down, having in the process cemented the American commitment to the offshore island as well as Taiwan itself. This had the effect of ‘freezing’ the situation until Sino-American relations ere normalized twenty years later.