Key capital market participants were too late in recognizing the problems at Enron, and at many other . rms as well, in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Debate about a laundry list of possible changes needed to deter future Enron situations has been widespread. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed independent monitoring of audit . rms, called for audit .rms to sell their consulting businesses or to eliminate certain types of consulting with audit clients and disclosure of analyst involvement and compensation with their . rms’ investment banking activities. Other proposals have suggested changes in stock options, like requiring .rms to treat options as a current expense, imposing restrictions on the sale of stock by managers until after they leave of. ce, or requiring top executives to return gains made from selling in a market that had been in uenced by fraudulent . nancial reporting. Many . rms are reacting by adding independent members to their board of directors and by assuring greater . nancial expertise and longer meetings for their audit committees.While these kinds of changes are likely to be helpful, we focus here on some more fundamental changes that are potentially needed to address the questions raised in our earlier analysis.