As we will discuss subsequently, the successful realization of the flex-crop agribusinesses’ preeminent hegemonic advantage is neither automatic, nor linear and in no way uncontested. It is mediated by economic and cultural distribution conflicts in different geographical scales, and subject to reflexive adjustments and unexpected twists through time. In fact, when enticing tactics are insufficient to make subjects behaving as they should, coercion comes into play. As Li argues, “more authoritarian forms of government are often reserved for sections of a population deemed especially deficient and unable to exercise the responsibility of freedom” (2005:387, stressed added). As we keep on arguing, the new extractivist government rationality builds on previous ones. Thus, some of the old labor and population control mechanisms particular to colonialism and to traditional landed upper classes’ estates are dismissed nowadays (like the colonato regime and its patron-client relations) while others remain (like coercion and threatening). Estate, private and parastatal31 violence is, therefore, also constitutive of the multiple logics of power steering the sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses’ investment strategy. Those resisting to enticing, legal dispossession tactics, or those involved in struggles for repossession or access to land resources (see below) are subject to intimidation, threatening and aggression. This is done through a series of means, namely the enclosure of non-selling peasants’ land within flex-crop plantations; harassment of those refusing to sell their land at the non- negotiable prices; impediment of the right of way (even to government officials); and the criminalization of indigenous and peasant struggles through the legal prosecution of leaders and violent evictions by state security forces and/or private and parastatal ones.
As we will discuss subsequently, the successful realization of the flex-crop agribusinesses’ preeminent hegemonic advantage is neither automatic, nor linear and in no way uncontested. It is mediated by economic and cultural distribution conflicts in different geographical scales, and subject to reflexive adjustments and unexpected twists through time. In fact, when enticing tactics are insufficient to make subjects behaving as they should, coercion comes into play. As Li argues, “more authoritarian forms of government are often reserved for sections of a population deemed especially deficient and unable to exercise the responsibility of freedom” (2005:387, stressed added). As we keep on arguing, the new extractivist government rationality builds on previous ones. Thus, some of the old labor and population control mechanisms particular to colonialism and to traditional landed upper classes’ estates are dismissed nowadays (like the colonato regime and its patron-client relations) while others remain (like coercion and threatening). Estate, private and parastatal31 violence is, therefore, also constitutive of the multiple logics of power steering the sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses’ investment strategy. Those resisting to enticing, legal dispossession tactics, or those involved in struggles for repossession or access to land resources (see below) are subject to intimidation, threatening and aggression. This is done through a series of means, namely the enclosure of non-selling peasants’ land within flex-crop plantations; harassment of those refusing to sell their land at the non- negotiable prices; impediment of the right of way (even to government officials); and the criminalization of indigenous and peasant struggles through the legal prosecution of leaders and violent evictions by state security forces and/or private and parastatal ones.
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