moral persons, as creatures having a conception of good and capable of a systems The basis is to be similarity in these two of ends are not ranked val ave the Together with to understand and each man is presumed h the to act upon whatever principles are adopted. of gnorance, th justice as those which ese conditions define the principles of consent to rational persons concerned to advance their interests would ocial and as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural contingencies. There is, however, another side to justifying a particular description of the position. This is to see if the principles be considered convictions of justi or extend them in an acceptable way. We can ce note whether applying these principles would lead us to make the same judge ments about the ba of society which we now make intuitively and in which we have the greatest confidence; or whether, in where our present judgements are in doubt and given with these resolution which we can affirm on reflection. There are questions which we feel. sure must be answered in a certain way. For example, we are confident that religious intolerance and racial discrimin ation are unjust. We think that we have examined these things with care and have reached what we believe is an impartial judgement not likely to be distorted by an excessive attention to our own interests These convictions are provisional fixed points which we presume any conception of justice must fit. But we have much less assurance as to wha is the correct distribution of wealth and authority. Here we may be looking for a way to remove our doubts. We can check an interpretation of the initial si by the capacity of its principles to accommodate our firmest convictions and to provide guidance where guidance is needed. In searching for the most favoured description of this situation we work from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it presents generally shared and preferably weak conditions. We th en see if these principles are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, we look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and these principles match our considered convictions of justice, then so far well and good. But presumably there will be discrepancies. this case we have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgements, for even the judgements we originally take as fixed are liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgements and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective quilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgements coincide; and it reflective since we know to what principles our judgements conform and the premises of their derivation. At the moment everything is in order. But this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further examination of the conditions which should be imposed on the contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to revise our judgements Yet for the time being we have done what we can to render coherent and to justify our convictions of social iustice. We have reached a conception of the original position หน้าสุดท้าย