Despite the agency’s reincarnation as a military enterprise, the OSS struggled to find
traction amidst bureaucratic turf wars in Washington and to wean itself from its dependence on
counterparts at the British intelligence services, including Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or
Military Intelligence 6), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the British Security
Cooperation (BSC).
2 According to many American and British sources, bureaucrats saw the OSS
as a weak ring of amateur spies that provided little useful information, ridiculed by the satirical
title “Oh So Silly.”
3 But in November 1942, when the OSS participated in Operation TORCH alongside American and British forces in French North Africa, now Morocco and Algeria, the
organization’s bureaucratic reputation took a turn. General Mark W. Clark requested an OSS
contingent alongside his Fifth Army at Oujda in Morocco, and the British SOE rushed to set up
its own independent foothold in Algiers. What made Operation TORCH a turning point for the
OSS and its role in the war? And what were the implications of this change for Anglo-American
intelligence cooperation?
Ironically, OSS contributions in military intelligence, psychological warfare, and covert
operations at best offered uneven support to Operation TORCH. Most scholars agree that the
OSS failed to accomplish many of its objectives for the November 8th invasion; one author
argues that OSS efforts, in fact, “had dire consequences for the future of the Allied war effort.”
4
But while the OSS had mixed operational results, TORCH proved a major political win for the
new organization. The OSS gained recognition from top U.S. military brass following TORCH
and transitioned into a new relationship with British intelligence, moving out from under its
tutelage to become a more equal partner – and a rival as well
Despite the agency’s reincarnation as a military enterprise, the OSS struggled to findtraction amidst bureaucratic turf wars in Washington and to wean itself from its dependence oncounterparts at the British intelligence services, including Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, orMilitary Intelligence 6), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the British SecurityCooperation (BSC).2 According to many American and British sources, bureaucrats saw the OSSas a weak ring of amateur spies that provided little useful information, ridiculed by the satiricaltitle “Oh So Silly.”3 But in November 1942, when the OSS participated in Operation TORCH alongside American and British forces in French North Africa, now Morocco and Algeria, theorganization’s bureaucratic reputation took a turn. General Mark W. Clark requested an OSScontingent alongside his Fifth Army at Oujda in Morocco, and the British SOE rushed to set upits own independent foothold in Algiers. What made Operation TORCH a turning point for theOSS and its role in the war? And what were the implications of this change for Anglo-Americanintelligence cooperation?Ironically, OSS contributions in military intelligence, psychological warfare, and covertoperations at best offered uneven support to Operation TORCH. Most scholars agree that theOSS failed to accomplish many of its objectives for the November 8th invasion; one authorargues that OSS efforts, in fact, “had dire consequences for the future of the Allied war effort.”4But while the OSS had mixed operational results, TORCH proved a major political win for thenew organization. The OSS gained recognition from top U.S. military brass following TORCHand transitioned into a new relationship with British intelligence, moving out from under itstutelage to become a more equal partner – and a rival as well
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