Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [15], evolutionary games have been widely studied on lattices and complex networks [18–23]. Recently, the evolutionary game with limited interactions among two kinds of individuals on a square lattice is studied [24]. It is found that cooperation is boosted when individuals’ strategy selection time evolves based on their historical learning information in Moreover, researchers found that a phase transition characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when the initial fraction of the cooperators exceeds a
certain threshold .
Evolutionary games on scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution is studied [27]. Too
strong heterogeneity might go against the maintaining of cooperation. Chen and Wang [28] have studied the evolutionary
PD game on small-world networks for different average aspiration levels under the stochastic updating rule, and found
that there exists an appropriate intermediate aspiration level leading to the maximum value of cooperation. Furthermore,
Ref. [29] reveals that lower mobility can lead to a higher level of cooperation when compared with that of higher mobility.
Cautiousness index [3] is assigned to individuals to control its learning activity. The work shows that cooperation can be
greatly promoted in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Ref. [30] develop a framework to investigate the role played
by diversity in promoting cooperation in evolutionary game theory. It is found that cooperation would not benefit if
diversity is too strong. The similar result, i.e., a suitable degree of diversity among individuals can promote the emergence
of cooperation, is also found in Ref. [31].
In spite of the achievements of the recent years
Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [15], evolutionary games have been widely studied on lattices and complex networks [18–23]. Recently, the evolutionary game with limited interactions among two kinds of individuals on a square lattice is studied [24]. It is found that cooperation is boosted when individuals’ strategy selection time evolves based on their historical learning information in Moreover, researchers found that a phase transition characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when the initial fraction of the cooperators exceeds a
certain threshold .
Evolutionary games on scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution is studied [27]. Too
strong heterogeneity might go against the maintaining of cooperation. Chen and Wang [28] have studied the evolutionary
PD game on small-world networks for different average aspiration levels under the stochastic updating rule, and found
that there exists an appropriate intermediate aspiration level leading to the maximum value of cooperation. Furthermore,
Ref. [29] reveals that lower mobility can lead to a higher level of cooperation when compared with that of higher mobility.
Cautiousness index [3] is assigned to individuals to control its learning activity. The work shows that cooperation can be
greatly promoted in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Ref. [30] develop a framework to investigate the role played
by diversity in promoting cooperation in evolutionary game theory. It is found that cooperation would not benefit if
diversity is too strong. The similar result, i.e., a suitable degree of diversity among individuals can promote the emergence
of cooperation, is also found in Ref. [31].
In spite of the achievements of the recent years
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..

Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [15], evolutionary games have been widely studied on lattices and complex networks [18–23]. Recently, the evolutionary game with limited interactions among two kinds of individuals on a square lattice is studied [24]. It is found that cooperation is boosted when individuals’ strategy selection time evolves based on their historical learning information in Moreover, researchers found that a phase transition characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when the initial fraction of the cooperators exceeds a
certain threshold .
Evolutionary games on scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution is studied [27]. Too
strong heterogeneity might go against the maintaining of cooperation. Chen and Wang [28] have studied the evolutionary
PD game on small-world networks for different average aspiration levels under the stochastic updating rule, and found
that there exists an appropriate intermediate aspiration level leading to the maximum value of cooperation. Furthermore,
Ref. [29] reveals that lower mobility can lead to a higher level of cooperation when compared with that of higher mobility.
Cautiousness index [3] is assigned to individuals to control its learning activity. The work shows that cooperation can be
greatly promoted in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Ref. [30] develop a framework to investigate the role played
by diversity in promoting cooperation in evolutionary game theory. It is found that cooperation would not benefit if
diversity is too strong. The similar result, i.e., a suitable degree of diversity among individuals can promote the emergence
of cooperation, is also found in Ref. [31].
In spite of the achievements of the recent years
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
