Policies: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis
After the Asian Financial Crisis, there were two different types of recommendations for policies that could be implemented to avoid this type of financial crisis in the future. The first group separated developing countries from developed countries, faulting underdeveloped economic and financial institutions in developing countries for the crisis. The second group viewed Asia's meltdown as a phenomenon caused by the inherently unstable nature of finance. As it turned out, lessons taken from the recommendations of the second group have proved applicable to the current global crisis caused by the meltdown in the US subprime markets. This time around, financial crisis began in and spread immediately to the most developed nations in the world.
As Paul Krugman discusses, the nature of the Asian Financial Crisis was different from the nature of previous crises as explained in crisis modelling, as it was not driven by fiscal imbalances or abandonment of fixed exchange rates to follow monetary policy (although pegs were abandoned). He sets out to model the Asian Crisis in What Happened to Asia?, http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~partha/asia%20Paul%20Krugman%20What%20Happened%20To%20Asia.pdf. This type of crisis was based on bursting of asset price bubbles, which led to insolvencies of financial intermediaries and further asset price deflation, which is similar to (although much simpler than) what occurred in the US housing market. We can learn lessons, then, from this crisis today.
Quoted from the Institute for International Economics, Chapter 5: Lessons of the Asian Financial Crisis and Concluding Remarks(http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/22/5iie261x.pdf):
1. Leaving reform of the financial sector and of the prudential/supervisory framework too late in the economic development process is a bad idea...
2. The composition of foreign borrowing deserves as much attention as the overall debt burden.
3. Rapid expansion of bank and nonbank credit (far in excess of the growth of the real economy), cum high concentration of credit to the real estate and equity markets, is almost always a harbinger of trouble, in developing and industrial countries alike.
4. Large current-account deficits that are used to finance investment may render economies less vulnerable to speculative attacks than those used almost exclusively to finance a boom in consumption...
5. Efforts to promote financial and capital account liberalization without first strengthening the prudential framework...are a recipe for disaster.
6. Long-standing weaknesses in the economy that lenders seemingly ignored for long periods of time can take on a different character in the midst of crises elsewhere in the region.
7. Overshooting of exchange rates and equity prices can be larger than we thought in an atmosphere of political instability, uncertainty about reform, and wide-ranging contagion.
8. It's much tougher to battle your way out of a crisis when the region's largest economy is struggling with its own macroeconomic, financial, and exchange rate problems than when that regional hub is in good overall shape.
9. The distinction that was drawn after the Mexican peso crisis between sovereign debt and private debt has turned out not to be nearly so neat and tidy.
10. There's nothing like a major crisis to focus people's minds on why it is important to improve the international financial architecture.
Policies: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis
After the Asian Financial Crisis, there were two different types of recommendations for policies that could be implemented to avoid this type of financial crisis in the future. The first group separated developing countries from developed countries, faulting underdeveloped economic and financial institutions in developing countries for the crisis. The second group viewed Asia's meltdown as a phenomenon caused by the inherently unstable nature of finance. As it turned out, lessons taken from the recommendations of the second group have proved applicable to the current global crisis caused by the meltdown in the US subprime markets. This time around, financial crisis began in and spread immediately to the most developed nations in the world.
As Paul Krugman discusses, the nature of the Asian Financial Crisis was different from the nature of previous crises as explained in crisis modelling, as it was not driven by fiscal imbalances or abandonment of fixed exchange rates to follow monetary policy (although pegs were abandoned). He sets out to model the Asian Crisis in What Happened to Asia?, http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~partha/asia%20Paul%20Krugman%20What%20Happened%20To%20Asia.pdf. This type of crisis was based on bursting of asset price bubbles, which led to insolvencies of financial intermediaries and further asset price deflation, which is similar to (although much simpler than) what occurred in the US housing market. We can learn lessons, then, from this crisis today.
Quoted from the Institute for International Economics, Chapter 5: Lessons of the Asian Financial Crisis and Concluding Remarks(http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/22/5iie261x.pdf):
1. Leaving reform of the financial sector and of the prudential/supervisory framework too late in the economic development process is a bad idea...
2. The composition of foreign borrowing deserves as much attention as the overall debt burden.
3. Rapid expansion of bank and nonbank credit (far in excess of the growth of the real economy), cum high concentration of credit to the real estate and equity markets, is almost always a harbinger of trouble, in developing and industrial countries alike.
4. Large current-account deficits that are used to finance investment may render economies less vulnerable to speculative attacks than those used almost exclusively to finance a boom in consumption...
5. Efforts to promote financial and capital account liberalization without first strengthening the prudential framework...are a recipe for disaster.
6. Long-standing weaknesses in the economy that lenders seemingly ignored for long periods of time can take on a different character in the midst of crises elsewhere in the region.
7. Overshooting of exchange rates and equity prices can be larger than we thought in an atmosphere of political instability, uncertainty about reform, and wide-ranging contagion.
8. It's much tougher to battle your way out of a crisis when the region's largest economy is struggling with its own macroeconomic, financial, and exchange rate problems than when that regional hub is in good overall shape.
9. The distinction that was drawn after the Mexican peso crisis between sovereign debt and private debt has turned out not to be nearly so neat and tidy.
10. There's nothing like a major crisis to focus people's minds on why it is important to improve the international financial architecture.
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