The direct evidence has three main parts. First, the crisis hit only countries that were in a
vulnerable position, i.e. with high levels of short-term foreign debt relative to short-term foreign assets. No emerging market with low levels of short-term debt relative to reserves was hit, even those with high levels of corruption and weak banking systems. Second, the crisis hit several countries with widely varying economic structures and fundamentals within a relatively short period of time. Korea and Indonesia had relatively little in common at the time of the crisis,except the levels of short-term debt and a common geographical region. Third, the crisis eased up after about one year, even though several fundamental conditions (e.g., corporate and bank financial health) were not significantly improved. The most striking example is Indonesia, where the rupiah appreciated substantially between mid-July and the end of October, starting only weeks after the chaos surrounding the resignation of Suharto. This can hardly be interpreted as a return of investor confidence, since most investors are even more uncertain about Indonesia=s future in the wake of Suharto=s downfall, and the ensuing political and social instability. The easing of the crisis reflects, in our interpretation, the end of the short-term outflows of capital. As debts were repaid, rescheduled, or defaulted upon, there was little foreign capital left to flee. As the net capital outflows subsided, the intense pressure on the exchange rate ended, and the overshooting caused by financial panic was reversed.