2.2. Implications for the exchange rate
Our model so far has dealt exclusively with the effect of a loss of confidence on the value of a single firm. Aggregating similar firms to create an economy-wide collapse of firms’ values is straightforward. We can also reasonably assume that foreign investors and many domestic investors care about returns in dollars. We then have the result that a fall in R, which is now a loss of confidence about returns in dollars, can trigger a fall in firms’ values in dollars (i.e., the value of the stock market in dollar terms). Note that firms’ values could fall sharply, even if there is not much actual stealing, because the value of firms’ to outsiders is determined by expected expropriation.
But will such a collapse of firms’ values occur alongside an exchange rate collapse? Theoretically, a sharp fall in stock prices need not affect the exchange rate. Outside investors can choose to bring more capital into the country if, for example, they are more patient than domestic investors. The exchange rate only depreciates if the loss of confidence about R also triggers a fall in capital inflows or larger capital outflows. Greenspan (1998, p. 3) explains the depreciation spiral and its spread across countries as follows: “The loss of confidence can trigger rapid and disruptive changes in the pattern of finance, which, in turn feeds back on exchange rates and asset prices. Moreover, investor concerns that weaknesses revealed in one economy may be present in others that are similarly structured means that the loss of confidence can be quickly spread to other countries.” In fact, if the foreign exchange market is forward looking, the mere prospect of a reduction in net capital inflows should be enough to cause an immediate depreciation.
There are five reasons why a loss of confidence can cause the net capital inflow to fall and why this fall can be larger when corporate governance is weaker. First, when the expected return to outside investors is lower, investing in a country is less attractive. Outside investors receive less because the actual returns on investment projects are lower and because managers steal more. For a given level of expected risk, lower expected returns tend to reduce the net capital inflow to a particular country. In a full model, if investors learn that the expected return in a country is lower, while risk is unchanged or has even increased, their preference for assets in this country will be reduced. This is one reason why many global investment funds cut their positions in emerging markets in 1997–98 (see International Organization of Securities Commissions (1998)). Weaker corporate governance means lower short-term expected returns or more risk or both.
Second, there are important agency-related reasons why traders who have just lost a great deal of money cannot immediately invest more in a country, even if they believe that the expected returns are high. Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) develop a model in which traders cannot persuade their financial backers that they should be allowed to invest more, because having lost money may indicate that the trader has bad judgment: “The seemingly perverse behavior of taking money away from an arbitrageur after noise trader sentiment deepens, i.e., precisely when his expected return is greatest, is a rational response to the problem of trying to infer the arbitrageur's (unobserved) ability and future opportunities jointly from past returns”, (p. 41.) In reaction to a fall in asset prices, financial backers might insist that the trader cut his or her position in a country even further. Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) make this argument for hedge funds involved in arbitrage, but the same argument can be applied to large international banks lending to countries. As these investors pull their money out, the exchange rate depreciates.
Third, there could be particular institutional reasons why commercial banks refuse to roll over their loans. This might be due to regulatory rules and procedures that limit a bank's “value at risk” (Cornelius, 1999). When prices fall in a market, the value-at-risk models used by international banks can generate the direct requirement that the bank reduce its exposure to that country (Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 1998.) Unless the borrower defaults when the loans are not rolled over, this constitutes a capital outflow. Even if the borrower defaults, there will still be a reduction in new capital inflow. The details of value-at-risk models vary, but a bigger fall in asset prices, due to worse corporate governance, can plausibly trigger a larger reduction in the bank's investment position in all the assets of that country.
The fourth reason that a loss of confidence can trigger a decline in net capital inflow is that when managers choose to steal more of the corporate cash, they might take the money outside the country. For this to happen, managers must care about their returns in foreign currency