defense but is not allowed to assist UN peacekeepers from other countries in close
proximity (engaged in a separate mission) attacked by hostile forces.
Second, Japanese peace-building emphasizes the non-use of force, human
security and ODA incentives. In January 2002 in Singapore, then Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichiro declared that Japan will help to prevent conflict in Aceh,
Mindanao and East Timor.viii In May the same year, Koizumi proposed that peacebuilding
will become a new pillar in Japanese foreign policy.ix Subsequently, Japan
hosted international conferences in Tokyo to mobilize global support and resources as
economic peace incentives to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Aceh.
Japan seemed ever ready to organize international conferences in Tokyo for peacebuilding
because such an approach is non-controversial, safe and publicity-generating.
Despite its so-called “lost decades” following the bursting of its “bubble economy”,
Japan is still a rich country and is willing to offer generous financial contributions to
peace-building. But what is most lacking in Japanese peace-building are ideas to
conflict resolution, leadership in peacemaking, and offering sufficient manpower
beyond tokenism in peacekeeping and peace-monitoring.x
Human Security and Peace-building: Contributions and Limitations
Though paved with good intentions, the outcome of Japan’s peace-building and
human security endeavor thus far is rather modest if not paltry. The exception is its
contributions to Cambodia when Japan ran the whole gamut of peacemaking,
peacekeeping and post-conflict consolidation of peace. Japan was a key financier to
the UNPKO to Cambodia while Akashi Yasushi, a senior UN bureaucrat and Japanese
national, was the UN special representative in charge of the UNPKO in Cambodia.
The UNPKO mission ended after the conclusion of a national election leading to the
formation of a new Khmer government. Even that election was problematic because
Hun Sen, the electoral loser, refused to yield power to Prince Rannaridh, the winner
but the international community was willing to accept an unworkable compromise for
Cambodia to have a coalition government with two competing co-Prime Ministers.
Things came to a head in 1997 when the co-Prime Ministers and their factions
were on the verge of a civil war. Japan intervened and brokered a political
compromise between the two Khmer factions which paved the way to another
election leading to the consolidation of Hun Sen’s power and the marginalization of
Rannaridh. Tokyo’s role was critical in this conflict. If civil war had erupted again,
then the hard work of the UN and the international community to run the first post-
Cold War peacekeeping operation and restore peace in Cambodia would have
unraveled. This was a rare case where Japan and its top leadership in the Cabinet and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a creative and decisive role to defuse a regional
conflict.
But subsequent Japanese peace-building in Sri Lanka and Aceh was
disappointing. The Koizumi Administration appointed Akashi as Japan’s Special
Representative for Peace-Building in Sri Lanka. Akashi cooperated with Norway,
which earlier succeeded in brokering a tenuous ceasefire between the government of
Sri Lanka (dominated by Sinhalese) and the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2002. Japan
was already the largest ODA donor to Sri Lanka when it committed itself to peacebuilding
there. It was in charge of economic reconstruction and humanitarian
assistance in Sri Lanka while Norway concentrated on political mediation.