But should we rely on the testimony of other people as part of our inference to the best explanation
of sensory reports? After all, they might be lying or joking, rather than actually reporting their
experience of the bread. Once again, our assessment of the truth of what people say to us is a matter
of inference to the best explanation. You are justified in believing that someone is telling the truth if
that is the best available explanation of all the available evidence. People are usually motivated to
describe things as they think they are, so you are justified in taking what they say as relevant
evidence, as long as there isn't evidence supporting alternative hypotheses such as deception or
hallucination. Testimony justified by inference to the best explanation allows me to reasonably
believe many things observed by others. I have never been to Mount Everest myself but do not doubt
its existence, because the observational reports of many others are better explained by the hypothesis
that the mountain exists than by alternative hypotheses such as mass deception.
But how do we know that the experiences reported by other people are at all the same as ours?
Maybe when you say you are experiencing brown, chewy bread, you are really having the same
experience I have when I experience white, soggy bread. There are two reasons for doubting that
there is sufficient variability in experience to undermine the usefulness of testimony. First, the general
pattern of experiences that people usually report has a great deal of overall coherence with my pattern
of experience, which makes it implausible that we differ in just one kind of experience such as brown
or chewy. Second, there is much evidence from anatomy and brain scanning experiments to suggest
that people's brains are very similar for sensory processing. Hence there is good reason to take the
testimonial reports of other people at face value, in the absence of evidence that they are lying or
demented.
In addition to multisensory coherence and the testimony of other people, there is a third reason for
inferring that our perceptions of objects are approximately true: we can often corroborate them with
measurements taken by instruments. People don't usually subject a loaf of bread to instrumental
inspection, but a physicist could use calipers to measure its height and width, a spectrometer to
measure the color reflectance of the loaf, an artificial odor detector to measure molecules near the
loaf, and so on. Such measurements carried out by people or possibly even by robots provide further
evidence best explained by the supposition that the loaf of bread exists. Similar arguments support
inference to the existence of many other kinds of objects, from lions to mountains. Contrary to
empiricism, scientific knowledge does not come just from our senses, but goes beyond them via a
multitude of reliable instruments from telescopes and microscopes to Geiger counters (used to
measure radiation) and particle colliders (used to detect the behavior of subatomic particles). The
efficacy of scientific instruments is incompatible with idealism, because their measurements do not
depend on mental activity, but it fits well with constructive realism
But should we rely on the testimony of other people as part of our inference to the best explanationof sensory reports? After all, they might be lying or joking, rather than actually reporting theirexperience of the bread. Once again, our assessment of the truth of what people say to us is a matterof inference to the best explanation. You are justified in believing that someone is telling the truth ifthat is the best available explanation of all the available evidence. People are usually motivated todescribe things as they think they are, so you are justified in taking what they say as relevantevidence, as long as there isn't evidence supporting alternative hypotheses such as deception orhallucination. Testimony justified by inference to the best explanation allows me to reasonablybelieve many things observed by others. I have never been to Mount Everest myself but do not doubtits existence, because the observational reports of many others are better explained by the hypothesisthat the mountain exists than by alternative hypotheses such as mass deception.But how do we know that the experiences reported by other people are at all the same as ours?Maybe when you say you are experiencing brown, chewy bread, you are really having the sameexperience I have when I experience white, soggy bread. There are two reasons for doubting thatthere is sufficient variability in experience to undermine the usefulness of testimony. First, the generalpattern of experiences that people usually report has a great deal of overall coherence with my patternof experience, which makes it implausible that we differ in just one kind of experience such as brownor chewy. Second, there is much evidence from anatomy and brain scanning experiments to suggestthat people's brains are very similar for sensory processing. Hence there is good reason to take thetestimonial reports of other people at face value, in the absence of evidence that they are lying ordemented.In addition to multisensory coherence and the testimony of other people, there is a third reason forinferring that our perceptions of objects are approximately true: we can often corroborate them withmeasurements taken by instruments. People don't usually subject a loaf of bread to instrumentalinspection, but a physicist could use calipers to measure its height and width, a spectrometer tomeasure the color reflectance of the loaf, an artificial odor detector to measure molecules near theloaf, and so on. Such measurements carried out by people or possibly even by robots provide furtherevidence best explained by the supposition that the loaf of bread exists. Similar arguments supportinference to the existence of many other kinds of objects, from lions to mountains. Contrary toempiricism, scientific knowledge does not come just from our senses, but goes beyond them via amultitude of reliable instruments from telescopes and microscopes to Geiger counters (used tomeasure radiation) and particle colliders (used to detect the behavior of subatomic particles). Theefficacy of scientific instruments is incompatible with idealism, because their measurements do notdepend on mental activity, but it fits well with constructive realism
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