Safety management systems
Safety management systems are recognized
and acceptedworldwide as bestpractice
methods for managing risk.
They typically consist of 10–20 program
elements that must be effectively
carried out to manage the risks in an
acceptable way. This need is based on
the understanding that once a risk is
accepted, it does not go away; it is
there waiting for an opportunity to
happen unless the management system
is actively monitoring company
operations for concerns and taking
proactive actions to correct potential
problems.
As a primary corporate objective,
dust explosion prevention and mitigation
would typically fall within the
scope of a Process Safety Management
system (i.e., a management system for
process-related hazards such as fire,
explosion, release of toxic materials,
etc.) One such system widely used in
industry is termed PSM, Process Safety
Management—where PSM is defined
as the application of management
principles and systems to the identification,
understanding and control of
process hazards to prevent processrelated
injuries and accidents. The
suite of PSM elements is shown in ตาราง 6
In light of the previous discussion on
the hierarchy of controls, a strong case
can be made for the need to demonstrate
a commitment to the principles
of inherent safety within each of the
PSM elements listed in Table 6.16 Thus,
within element 6, process risk management,
the hierarchical arrangement of
dust explosion prevention and mitigation
measures shown in Table 5 would
find direct application. Additionally,
within element 8, training and performance,
a strong safety culture would
necessitate the provision of workplace
training in dust explosion hazards, and
how these hazards can be alleviated by
application of, for example, the inherent
safety principle of minimization
through effective housekeeping. As
illustrated by the analysis that follows
for element 9, similar observations can
be made for the other PSM elements in
Table 6.
In a previous paper, Amyotte et al.15
have demonstrated that three of Hopkins’
four safety subcultures (reporting,
just and learning) have an explicit link
to the PSM element of incident investigation.
With respect to the subject of
the current paper, a company’s commitment
to just and reporting cultures
will ultimately be expressed in the
number of dust explosion incidents
that are reported. In the spirit of a
leading indicator, it would be important
to also measure the number of
near-miss and at-risk behaviour
reports involving combustible powders.
The outputs of reporting and
investigating will manifest themselves
as a measure of commitment to a learning
culture; lessons learned is a key
phrase in the industrial lexicon. The
idea of learning from experience
extends beyond the realm of incident
investigation and into other safety
management system elements (e.g.,
process risk management, management
of change, and enhancement of
process safety knowledge).
It may be tempting to dismiss talk of
safety culture and safety management
systems as being unimportant in relation
to the chemistry, physics and engineering
of dust explosions. Further,
safety culture might be viewed by some
as merely the current ‘hot topic’ in
industrial safety—i.e., a relatively new
concept that, given time, will be
replaced by something else. On the
first matter, the next section will hopefully
dispel any notion that well-established
technical knowledge, in the
absence of a strong safety culture and
management system, is sufficient to
ensure an acceptably low dust explosion
risk. On the second point, we offer
the following quote from the last paragraph
of Count Morozzo’s report2
describing the Turin flour warehouse
explosion mentioned in the introduction:
Ignorance of the fore-mentioned circumstances,
and a culpable negligence of
those precautions which ought to be
taken, have often caused more misfortunes
and loss than the most contriving
malice. It is therefore of great importance
that these facts should be universally
known, that public utility may reap from
them every possible advantage.
The above passage makes an eloquent
case for the importance of a
strong safety culture, incident investigation,
and the sharing of lessons
learned. It is instructive to also note
that it was written over 200 years ago.