22. See Seyhun [1998] for a comprehensive review of this literature and a discussion of SEC rules, filing requirements, and available data.
if Net Purchases is zero, and negative one if Net Purchases is negative.
Table XII summarizes the results of these regressions. Columns (1) and (3) give results for the full sample, with G as the key regressor. columns (2) and (4) give results for the sample restricted to firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios with a Democracy dummy as the key regressor. Coefficients on all control variables are omitted from the table. We find no significant relationships between governance and insider trading. Two of four sets of regressions have positive average coefficients, two have negative average coefficients, and none of these average coefficients are significant. In untabulated results we also estimated median regressions, replicated all of the above results using all transactions (the main difference is the inclusion of option-exercise transactions), and estimated long-horizon regressions using all years of data for each firm. In none of these cases did we find a robust relationship between governance and insider trading. Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis II in the insider-trading data.
22. See Seyhun [1998] for a comprehensive review of this literature and a discussion of SEC rules, filing requirements, and available data.if Net Purchases is zero, and negative one if Net Purchases is negative. Table XII summarizes the results of these regressions. Columns (1) and (3) give results for the full sample, with G as the key regressor. columns (2) and (4) give results for the sample restricted to firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship Portfolios with a Democracy dummy as the key regressor. Coefficients on all control variables are omitted from the table. We find no significant relationships between governance and insider trading. Two of four sets of regressions have positive average coefficients, two have negative average coefficients, and none of these average coefficients are significant. In untabulated results we also estimated median regressions, replicated all of the above results using all transactions (the main difference is the inclusion of option-exercise transactions), and estimated long-horizon regressions using all years of data for each firm. In none of these cases did we find a robust relationship between governance and insider trading. Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis II in the insider-trading data.
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