While these factors are not negligible, none of them, separately or in
combination, provide an exhaustive explanation for Russian policy. It is amazing to
watch Russian hardliners and many Western and Middle Eastern analysts join
together to grossly exaggerate Russia’s strategic interests in Syria. Existing military,
economic, cultural/educational, and other links notwithstanding, Syria’s importance
as a purchaser of Russian arms should not be overestimated, especially given the
poor paying record of Damascus. The small Russian naval facility at Tartus has more
symbolic than real significance. Until very recently, the Assad regime has not
bothered to assert itself as Moscow’s political ally. Russia’s economic interest in Syria
other than arms sales—in energy and other sectors—is real, but it is modest
compared to economic cooperation with, for instance, neighboring Turkey. Even the
impact of the Russian election season, in which the government played on and
propagated anti-U.S. sentiment to appear ”tough on the West” and discredit
domestic opposition, cannot fully explain its unusual attachment to the Syrian
government.