Stalin ‘s calculations took into account the global balance and especially the situation in Europe. He refused to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in September 1945. Even though Ho had proved to be a trustworthy agent of the Comintern, Stalin’s European priorities made him assign a higher priority to helping the communists in France gain entry into the coalition government. With the outbreak of the Cold War, Stalin insisted that the East European states reject the offer of Marshall aid. The ever suspicious Stalin began to tighten his personal dominance of the ‘socialist camp’ in Europe through extensive purges of so-called cosmopolitans and others. This was also related to the confrontation with Tito and his expulsion from the socialist camp. Mao and the Chinese could not be treated in the same way. China was simply too big and the independent national character of its revolution as led by Mao was too well established.
This did not mean, however, granting the Chinese communists a free hand. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, Mao went to Moscow to negotiate a new treaty of alliance. He arrived on 16 December and he did not return to Chinese soil until 27 February 1950. Over the two months of hard bargaining Stalin succeeded in holding on to most of the gains he had claimed at Yalta and in the 1945 treaty with the nationalist government. But he also had to accept the burden of agreeing to come to China’s assistance in the event of an attack by Japan ‘or any atate allied with her and thus being in a state of war’. The latter qualification was to prove its importance in the Korean War and other Sino-American military engagements. Stalin may have disappointed his new Chinese allies with the paltriness of his economic assistance, limited to the value of US$300 million spread over five years, but he pleased them with his secret military assistance.
Residing or undertaking any economic activities in Manchuria or Xinjiang. Apparently, Stalin had in mind to insist on the exclusion of Americans in particulas from all parts of China, but eventually he settled for these bordering provinces, the effect of which was to limit any foreign economic influence there to the Soviet Union alone. The only precedents for this were the unequal treaties of the imperialist era. The Chinese leader had to swallow this bitter pill the day after they had, together with Stalin, repudiated Acheson’s accusations that Stalin had special designs on these territories. The pill was not sweetened by the inclusion of the Soviet Far East and Central Asia in the zones denied to third parties, as that ban was already in place. No protocol was kept secret for forty years. Mao’s bitterness was apparent when in 1958 he referred to these provinces as Soviet colonies.
As for broader Asian concerns, Stalin was keen to designate China as having primary responsibility for the further expansion of communism there without at the same time conceding that Mao had made independent contributions of universal significance to the treasure trove of Marxism – Leninism. In this way China could be a kind of buffer to absorb such relation as the American might choose to carry out without the Soviets conceding to Mao a leading role (albeit of a lesser kind) in the international communist movement. This was signaled in the order in which the two communist giants recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in January 1950. China was first on 18 January and the Soviet Union followed almost two later. During this time, of course, Mao was still in Moscow. Interestingly, Ho Chi Minh visited Moscow while Mao was there, but Kim Li-Sung did not
Throughout the early post-war years, Kim was wholly dependent on Moscow, and North Korea can be justly called a Soviet satellite. The Soviet Union also extended more military aid to the North in the late 1940s and early 1950s than to Mao’s armed forces during the same period. Despite the good personal relations between the Chinese and North Korean leaders, the lead-up to the war was determined almost exclusively by Stalin and Kim until a few months before the attack by the North. Kim had been pressing Stalin as early as 1949 for permission to unify the country by force by force. Attempts to ignite a takeover of the South by guerrilla warfare had failed. But Kim nevertheless hoped for a successful uprising once his troops had broken through the defences of the South. He claimed that a swift victory would ensue. Stalin, however, was concerned with the wider picture. He once told Kim that ‘the Americans’ will never agree to be thrown out of [Korea and] lose their reputation as great power’. But Stalin did not dismiss the possibility and consulted Mao. After all it was China, in Stalin’s calculations, that would have to bear the brunt of any failures. Apparently, Mao first thought that the Americans would intervene, only to backtrack on this view later. In any event Stalin continued to prevaricate. When Kim visited him in April, Stalin stressed his preoccupation with the situation in the West and urged him to consult Mao, as he had ‘a good understanding of Oriental matters’. In effect Stalin had consented, subject to Mao’s approval. But Mao had been manoeuvred into a situation where he could not disapprove. Having obtained Stalin’s promise of support for an invasion of Taiwan, Mao could hardly warn against the prospect of American intervention in Korea without inviting Stalin to draw similar conclusions about Taiwan. According to Chinese scholars, Mao, not surprisingly, urged Kim to rely upon guerrilla warfare. But Kim followed his own course with Soviet assistance.
Stalin’s objectives were mixed. Locally, he hoped to expand his buffer zone in Asia. From a regional perspective, by dominating the Korean peninsula he could expect to bring pressure to bear upon Japan that would limit its utility to the United States; moreover, he could also expect to widen the rift between Mao and the United States. Indeed, were Kim to fail, as indeed was the case, China and America could be expected to be engaged in hostilities, thereby drawing a line between them. From a more global strategic perspective America was bound to become more engaged in Asia – hopefully at the expense of its engagement in Europe – whether as a result of a humiliating loss or as a result of taking on a commitment in Korea. On the face of it the calculating Stalin had everything to gain and nothing to lose, whatever the outcome.
In the event, Stalin’s gains were mixed. The reaction of the Western allies in Europe – the key geopolitical centre between East and West – was to consolidate the newly established NATO with an integrated command structure. Moreover, the American intervention led to a huge re-armament programme enabling the United States to be engaged militarily in Asia without reducing its deployments in Europe. Japan became even more tightly locked into the American alliance network. China, however, became more estranged from the United States and, in Stalin’s terms, more trustworthy. But china had also proved itself in war to be a great power in its own right, and it was a China whose leaders had acquired new grievances against the Soviet Union. Right to the end Soviet interests were put ahead of those of China, even in Korea, where the terms for issue of Taiwan nor China’s entry into the UN. It has been suggested that in his last year Stalin began to soften his confrontationist approach in Europe and to recognize that the newly independent post – colonial states were a new factor in world politics. His death in March 1953 left the issue to be explored by his successors.