Numerous proposals for relieving or restructuring the debt burdens of
highly indebted nations have been put forward.14 These have ranged from a
new allocation of special drawing rights to restructuring (on better terms for
debtor countries) of principal payments falling due during an agreed consolidation
period. Most notable have been the Paris Club arrangements, offering
highly concessional conditions, the so-called Toronto terms. These bilateral
arrangements for public loans permit creditor governments to choose from
three alternative concessional options—partial cancellation of up to one-third
of nonconcessional loans, reduced interest rates, or extended (25-year) maturity
of payments—to generate cash flow savings for debtor countries. For
commercial banks, the 1989 Brady Plan linked partial debt forgiveness for selected
borrowers to IMF or World Bank financial support guaranteeing the
payment of the remaining loans as well as commitments by the indebted developing
countries to adopt stringent IMF-type adjustment programs, promote
free markets, welcome foreign investors, and repatriate overseas capital.
In addition, there has been much discussion of debt-for-equity swaps. These
are the sale at a discount (sometimes in excess of 50%) of questionable developing-country
commercial bank debts to private investors (mostly foreign corporations)
in secondary trading markets. These corporations then trade a
debtor’s IOU for a local state-owned asset, such as a steel mill or a telephone
company. Commercial banks are now more willing to engage in such transactions
because new interpretations and regulations for U.S. banks permit them
to take a loss on the loan swap while not reducing the book value of other
loans to that country. For the developing countries’ part, they are able through
debt-for-equity swaps to encourage private investments in local-currency assets
from both foreign and resident investors as well as to reduce their overall
debt obligations. Much of the privatization that has occurred in Latin American
debtor countries has been financed through these swap arrangements.
The flip side of these benefits, however, is the fact that foreign investors are
buying up the state-owned real assets of developing nations, such as steel
mills and telephone companies, at major discounts. Observers who worry
about developed-country penetration into developing economies or the exacerbation
of domestic dualistic tendencies are naturally troubled by these debtfor-equity
swaps. Between 1985 and 1992, they accounted for over 36% of all
debt conversions.