The inclusion of deferred tax assets (“DTA”) in bank regulatory capital has recently come under intense scrutiny. During the recent financial crisis, banks lobbied regulators to relax the restrictions on the inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital. On the other hand, the Basel Committee proposed that, since DTA rely on future profitability in order for benefits to be realized, they do not offer adequate protection against losses and should be excluded from capital. This study examines whether credit risk is increasing in the proportion of regulatory capital composed of DTA. Using a sample of bank holding companies, I find that banks with a larger percentage of regulatory capital composed of DTA have higher bond spreads and lower credit ratings, with the effect smaller for more profitable banks. Using a sample of large commercial banks I find that banks that had a larger proportion of capital composed of DTA at the beginning of the recent recession were more likely to fail during the recession. My results suggest that banks that have a larger proportion of regulatory capital composed of DTA have more credit risk, which is consistent with the idea advanced by regulators that DTA offer a fragile buffer against losses. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital, as well as the literatures examining the valuation of DTA and the association between regulatory capital and credit risk