One of the precise insights offered by Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990) is that users of natural resources can develop self-governing institutions in order to address overuse of the commons, or common-pool resources (CPRs), such as fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems, with little or no assistance from the state. Ostrom focused on and established in the literature the notion of user
self-governance as a powerful third alternative to the prevailing state and privatization solutions. Furthermore, she developed eight design principles as the essential prerequisites or conditions for robust, long-lasting self-governing institutions for managing CPRs (Ostrom, 1990, 1992). Institutions are sets of working rules that reflect the socially evolving or devised restrictions that structure political, economic, and social interaction (North, 2005; Ostrom, 1992). In the present study, institutions are considered to be sets of rules that fishers negotiate, formulate, and agree to adhere to when conducting fishing activities.