Over the past two decades, the CG literature in
accounting and auditing has grown rapidly. In the present
study, our CG focus is primarily on the various dimensions
of an AC. Documented evidence on effectiveness of an AC
in enhancing ‘good’ CG has focused on various aspects,
but the issue of interest in this study is the support of an AC
in enhancing ‘auditor’ independence. Knapp (1987), for
example, found that “an AC is more likely to supportacross
members of an AC. This is true regardless of whether the
member is in a full-time (or part-time) position, such as
corporate managers, academicians, and retired partners of
certified public accounting firms.”Similarly, Pearson (1980)
and Dockweiler (1986) showed that “an auditor’s reliance
on management is reduced due to the direct communication
with an AC.”However, Lam (2000) found that “the
appearance of independence of an AC would enhance
auditor independence and improve transparency in financial
reporting.”Beattie (1999) also reported that “audit partners,
finance directors, and financial journalists believed that
an AC with independent non-executive directors strongly
encourages auditor independence. Independent directors of
an AC are expected to increase the quality of monitoring
because they are not associated with the corporation
either as an officers or employees; thus, they would act
as the shareholder’s watchdog.” Similarly, Raghunandan
and Rama(2007) revealed that “an AC that consists of
qualified independent directors is better able to contribute
towards auditor independence.”To sum up, the extant
literature provides ‘strong’ empirical support that both an