Any increases in the stated offering price range or the number of shares offered may result in a situation where limited demand for the shares exist at or above the price offered in the IPO. Any excess market demand will be “soaked up” and thus it is unlikely that the stock will appreciate in the near term. It is important to note that the SkwizzNet has the option to peg the initial public offering price at a market price actually below the auction-determined price. The company and underwriters might attempt to do this: (1) to ensure a more broadly distributed stock offering (which would be expected to occur because at a lower offering price there should be a larger number of successful bids) or to potentially limit a decline in the market price of the stock in the period immediately after the IPO. This might be reasonably expected if the price was set in a more traditional book building process. However, setting the IPO price below the clearing price determined by the auction may not achieve the desired results. If the IPO price is set below the actual equilibrium-clearing price, the future price of the common stock could still trade significantly lower post the close of the public offering. In addition, setting the public offering price below the clearing price may result in a broader distribution of the firm’s shares. However, such a strategy may not actually result in changing the relative allocation of share to certain groups of investors, such as professional and/or institutional investors. That is because there can be no assurance that investors of one group would submit bids at different price than investors of other types, and so broadening the number of successful bids would not necessarily change the proportion of successful bids attributable to any one type of investor. Even if the IPO price is set near or equal to the “auction equilibrium clearing price” the actual price of the offering may not bear a relationship to and may even be significantly greater than the price that otherwise would be ascertained employing a conventional indicator of stock’s overall value. These conventional measures would include such things as: future prospects of the industry, sales, earnings and other preform financials and other key performance metrics. The professional investors usually apply multiples of revenue, earnings, operating cash flows and risk characteristics together with the market price of securities of publicly traded companies engaged in activities similar to the company conducting the IPO are also compared to come up with a final IPO offering price. In a typical IPO, the shares are usually distributed to professional investors who typically possess significant investment experience and expertise in determining a stock’s value. These professional investors usually have the ability to access and subsequently perform their own independent research and subsequent analysis. Less sophisticated investors (usually small retail) typically have only limited access to this level of research and analysis. As a result of the auction process and the leveling of the playing field, these less price sensitive investors could end up exerting a larger influence in determining the initial offering price of the IPO. They may also participate to a much greater degree in the offering than what would normally be expected in a more traditional initial public offering. Successful IPO investors in a Dutch auction face a classic behavioral problem of the winner’s curse. When an IPO is extremely “hot” both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors will demand shares, and the issue will be heavily oversubscribed. In these deals, investors will be rationed receiving only a fraction of the shares they requested. However when the deal book market is week these unsophisticated investors receive much greater allocation of the IPOs. The ongoing debate is whether the book building method favored by most investment bankers results in more efficient of IPOs than the Dutch auction method.