This study theoretically and empirically addresses the
possible separation of substance and symbolism in CEO
compensation contracts by examining political and
institutional determinants of long-term incentive plan
(LTIP) adoption and use among 570 of the largest U.S.
corporations over two decades. We find that a
substantial number of firms are likely to adopt but not
actually use-or only limitedly use-LTIPs, suggesting a
potential separation of substance and symbol in CEO
compensation contracts. Analyses suggest that this
decoupling of LTIP adoption and use is particularly
prevalent in firms with powerful CEOs and firms with
poor prior performance. Further analyses show that
whereas early adopters are more likely to pursue
alignment between CEO and shareholder interests
substantively, later adopters may pursue legitimacy by
symbolically controlling agency costs. More generally,
the study highlights how decoupling in organizations can
be understood in terms of both micro-political and
macro-institutional forces.'