The dependent variable is either the change in industry-adjusted EBIT/TA or the change
in industry-adjusted CF/TA from Year 1 relative to Year +1.3 Alpha represents the
ownership stake (in percent) held by the original owners after the IPO. Alpha2 and Alpha3
represent the quadratic and cubic forms, respectively. We control for Firm Age (calculated
as the difference between the establishment year and the IPO year) and Firm Size (log
Total Assets) because Mikkelson et al. (1997) suggest that firm age and firm size can
explain the variation of post-IPO operating performance. Older firms tend to have better
performance relative to young firms. Large firms tend to have better performance relative
to small firms. Previous research (such as Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes,
1990) includes capital expenditure as a control variable for firm performance. As
mentioned earlier, our measure of capital expenditure is the change in capital investment
(adjusting for depreciation charges) from the prior year, but in our regression setting we
standardize capital expenditures by total assets. Short and Keasey (1999) include a Growth
variable to capture firm’s growth as a determinant of performance. As defined earlier,
Growth is calculated as the percentage increase of annual sales from the prior year. To
control for capital structure changes, we include the proportion of debt (Bank Loans) to
total assets as suggested by Rajan (1992) and Pagano et al. (1998). We use bank debt as
the primary leverage measure as it is well known that Thai firms primarily rely on bank
loans for debt financing. However, our main findings are robust to different leverage
measures, even when including both short-term and long-term debt.
Regression results using the industry-adjusted change in EBIT/TA from Year 1 to
Year +1 as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3. In model 1, where we only
consider a linear relationship between firm performance and ownership, we find that the
ownership variable (alpha) is not significant. Thus, there does not seem to be a linear
relationship between the change in performance of the going-public firm and its post-IPO
managerial ownership. This result contradicts the findings of Jain and Kini (1994), but it
supports the findings of Mikkleson et al. (1997).4 That is, the change in firm performance
is not better for firms that retain a higher level of manager-owners. Instead, growing firms
with less bank loans seem to fare better than other firms.
The dependent variable is either the change in industry-adjusted EBIT/TA or the changein industry-adjusted CF/TA from Year 1 relative to Year +1.3 Alpha represents theownership stake (in percent) held by the original owners after the IPO. Alpha2 and Alpha3represent the quadratic and cubic forms, respectively. We control for Firm Age (calculatedas the difference between the establishment year and the IPO year) and Firm Size (logTotal Assets) because Mikkelson et al. (1997) suggest that firm age and firm size canexplain the variation of post-IPO operating performance. Older firms tend to have betterperformance relative to young firms. Large firms tend to have better performance relativeto small firms. Previous research (such as Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes,1990) includes capital expenditure as a control variable for firm performance. Asmentioned earlier, our measure of capital expenditure is the change in capital investment(adjusting for depreciation charges) from the prior year, but in our regression setting westandardize capital expenditures by total assets. Short and Keasey (1999) include a Growthvariable to capture firm’s growth as a determinant of performance. As defined earlier,Growth is calculated as the percentage increase of annual sales from the prior year. Tocontrol for capital structure changes, we include the proportion of debt (Bank Loans) tototal assets as suggested by Rajan (1992) and Pagano et al. (1998). We use bank debt asthe primary leverage measure as it is well known that Thai firms primarily rely on bankloans for debt financing. However, our main findings are robust to different leveragemeasures, even when including both short-term and long-term debt.Regression results using the industry-adjusted change in EBIT/TA from Year 1 toYear +1 as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3. In model 1, where we onlyconsider a linear relationship between firm performance and ownership, we find that theownership variable (alpha) is not significant. Thus, there does not seem to be a linearrelationship between the change in performance of the going-public firm and its post-IPOmanagerial ownership. This result contradicts the findings of Jain and Kini (1994), but itsupports the findings of Mikkleson et al. (1997).4 That is, the change in firm performanceis not better for firms that retain a higher level of manager-owners. Instead, growing firmswith less bank loans seem to fare better than other firms.
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