1.Introduction
An open economy is susceptible to a speculative attack; the smaller the economy, the more severely it is likely to get hurt. Good balances in economic components are the only immunity as well as medicine to such an attack. In 1992, the European Monetary System had to be practically abolished as its member economies had been consistently hit by speculators who had seen a way to exploit economic imbalances that made possible a devaluation of the economies’ currency. Two years later, Mexico had encountered calamitous, speculative attacks that had forced it to devalue the peso by more than 50%. Mexican banking and private sectors all got hurt and the economy had stopped growing for more than half a decade. On the other hand, only the central banks of the European economies had forfeited currency in their foreign reserve in order to promptly stop the crisis. Thailand was another open economy loudly hit by speculative attacks. It had enjoyed too much and too recklessly wealth in its good days, the habit which had given rise to serious imbalances of a number of the economy’s components. The overoptimistic characteristic of the economy had essentially led to the deterioration of its health. With the weak body, not for a long time could it stand against outside attacks from speculators. Being depleted of its foreign currency reserve in attempts to fight against the speculative forces, on July 2, 1997, Thailand decided to switch to a flexible exchange rate regime. The Thai bath was depreciated by more than 50% by the end of that year; the Thais had experienced a collapse of their economy for the first time.
This paper was aimed to give a clear picture of the Thai financial crisis and insight thoughts on some of the issues related. The paper was divided as follow: Section( 1) Introduction, Section( 2) An Anatomy of the Thai Financial Crisis, Section (3) Did the Thais Ignore the Painful Lessons of the Mexico?, Section(4) An Evaluation of the Thai Government Performance along Thailand’s Economic Path and in Response to the Crisis, (5) Final Remarks on the Future of the Thai Economy, Section (6) Conclusion.
1.บทนำ An open economy is susceptible to a speculative attack; the smaller the economy, the more severely it is likely to get hurt. Good balances in economic components are the only immunity as well as medicine to such an attack. In 1992, the European Monetary System had to be practically abolished as its member economies had been consistently hit by speculators who had seen a way to exploit economic imbalances that made possible a devaluation of the economies’ currency. Two years later, Mexico had encountered calamitous, speculative attacks that had forced it to devalue the peso by more than 50%. Mexican banking and private sectors all got hurt and the economy had stopped growing for more than half a decade. On the other hand, only the central banks of the European economies had forfeited currency in their foreign reserve in order to promptly stop the crisis. Thailand was another open economy loudly hit by speculative attacks. It had enjoyed too much and too recklessly wealth in its good days, the habit which had given rise to serious imbalances of a number of the economy’s components. The overoptimistic characteristic of the economy had essentially led to the deterioration of its health. With the weak body, not for a long time could it stand against outside attacks from speculators. Being depleted of its foreign currency reserve in attempts to fight against the speculative forces, on July 2, 1997, Thailand decided to switch to a flexible exchange rate regime. The Thai bath was depreciated by more than 50% by the end of that year; the Thais had experienced a collapse of their economy for the first time. This paper was aimed to give a clear picture of the Thai financial crisis and insight thoughts on some of the issues related. The paper was divided as follow: Section( 1) Introduction, Section( 2) An Anatomy of the Thai Financial Crisis, Section (3) Did the Thais Ignore the Painful Lessons of the Mexico?, Section(4) An Evaluation of the Thai Government Performance along Thailand’s Economic Path and in Response to the Crisis, (5) Final Remarks on the Future of the Thai Economy, Section (6) Conclusion.
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