Childhood obesity is one of the major concerns around the world often attributed to children’s increased calorie consumption and lack of physical activity. As part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, several major food manufacturers have adopted advertising initiatives that limit the advertising of unhealthy food categories to children, based on the belief that less advertising would lead to less consumption in those food categories. For example, the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) launched a Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) in 2006 as a form of CSR to promote healthy dietary habits and lifestyles among children under the age of 12. As of Jan 2010, 16 participating companies including PepsiCo, Coca-cola, McDonald, Kraft and others agreed to limit their advertising budget for traditional food and beverage products that might not be totally healthy. However, food manufacturers usually distribute products to consumers through retailers, whose advertising is not bound by those initiative programs. This raises a natural yet very important question : will the food consumption be reduced after one party (either the manufacturer or the retailer) voluntarily participate the advertising pledge by reducing his (her) advertising level to the unhealthy food product ? Based on the answer to this question, one may also ask, is it more effective for the leader (manufacturer or retailer) in a supply chain to participate the pledge than otherwise ?