The rapidity of the dual transition – toward democracy and market economies – made it virtually impossible for countries to establish laws and institutions that might restrain corruption. In fact, the World Bank study found that the dual transitions removed whatever mechanisms had been in place to control corrupt behaviors (World Bank, 2000: 26). The report concluded that “the simultaneous transition processes of building new political and economic institutions in the midst of a massive redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for state capture and administrative corruption” (World Bank, 2000: xix). As state officials began to distribute state properties and enterprises to private owners, bribes and payoffs were again a ready means of channeling the allocation of the richest assets. The World Bank reported that “numerous examples exist in all countries in transition where ownership or control of key state assets was transferred through nontransparent means to those with political influence; corruption played a key part in this process” (World Bank, 2000: 32). The nascent and fragile private sector was subjected to “a predatory tax system and was led to bribe officials in order to avoid paying taxes” (Varese, 1997: 580). Thus both communist rule and the transition to market economy were susceptible to corruption, and we would expect their effect still to be visible.