Since the collapse of Amaranth, several authors have attempted to understand what positions and risk levels Amaranth was engaged in to cause such a dramatic collapse (Chincarini, (2006) and Till, (2006). Chincarini (2006) used the information from newspapers, CEO statements, and actual natural gas futures data to quantify the nature of the most likely trades that were made at Amaranth. That paper hypothesized that Amaranth had engaged in a short summer, long winter natural gas trade primarily using natural gas futures. Based on these backward-engineered positions, the paper examined both the market and liquidity risk of Amaranth’s positions prior to its collapse. On June 25, 2007 the Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs released a document containing a detailed investigation of the Amaranth scandal entitled “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Markets.” The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations used its subpoena power to analyze the trading records at the NYMEX, the ICE, as well as the trades of Amaranth and other traders. It also conducted numerous interviews with natural gas market participants, including natural gas traders, producers, suppliers, and hedge fund managers, as well as exchange officials, regulators, and energy market experts. In this paper, we make extensive use of the Amaranth trading positions derived from the actual Amaranth trading data. This data was obtained under subpoena by the Senate Subcommittee. We also discuss the risks associated with the trades Amaranth made and what risk managers should do to avoid these risks in the future. The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II discusses the background of the firm Amaranth Advisors L L C; Section III discusses the natural gas futures market and details the basics of typical spread trades to help the reader appreciate the more complicated Amaranth trading strategies; Section IV discusses Amaranth’s actual trading positions on August 31, 2006 and in other periods; Section V analyzes the market and liquidity risks inherent in Amaranth’s natural gas positions; Section VI discusses lessons for regulators and risk managers, and Section VII provides a conclusion.
Since the collapse of Amaranth, several authors have attempted to understand what positions and risk levels Amaranth was engaged in to cause such a dramatic collapse (Chincarini, (2006) and Till, (2006). Chincarini (2006) used the information from newspapers, CEO statements, and actual natural gas futures data to quantify the nature of the most likely trades that were made at Amaranth. That paper hypothesized that Amaranth had engaged in a short summer, long winter natural gas trade primarily using natural gas futures. Based on these backward-engineered positions, the paper examined both the market and liquidity risk of Amaranth’s positions prior to its collapse. On June 25, 2007 the Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs released a document containing a detailed investigation of the Amaranth scandal entitled “Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Markets.” The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations used its subpoena power to analyze the trading records at the NYMEX, the ICE, as well as the trades of Amaranth and other traders. It also conducted numerous interviews with natural gas market participants, including natural gas traders, producers, suppliers, and hedge fund managers, as well as exchange officials, regulators, and energy market experts. In this paper, we make extensive use of the Amaranth trading positions derived from the actual Amaranth trading data. This data was obtained under subpoena by the Senate Subcommittee. We also discuss the risks associated with the trades Amaranth made and what risk managers should do to avoid these risks in the future. The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II discusses the background of the firm Amaranth Advisors L L C; Section III discusses the natural gas futures market and details the basics of typical spread trades to help the reader appreciate the more complicated Amaranth trading strategies; Section IV discusses Amaranth’s actual trading positions on August 31, 2006 and in other periods; Section V analyzes the market and liquidity risks inherent in Amaranth’s natural gas positions; Section VI discusses lessons for regulators and risk managers, and Section VII provides a conclusion.
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