What is a pragmatist response to the problem of moral disagreement? How are we
to engage in moral discourse without recourse to moral foundations? One source of
guidance in formulating an answer to these questions is Richard Bernstein’s The Pragmatic
Turn (2010), a model of contemporary pragmatist thinking. Pragmatism is all
too often reduced to a mere rejection of foundations. It has been said that pragmatism
is fundamentally subversive, bringing foundationalist thinking to an end, but
offering little else besides.1 Bernstein, however, demonstrates that pragmatism has a
more subtle and generous spirit than this. While there is no doubting its radical and
subversive core, pragmatism nonetheless moves beyond this radicality and subversion,
and actively identifies conceptual resources for making rational choices. In this
respect, pragmatism does not share the view that all arguments or perspectives are
fundamentally incomparable and that we lack any means for rational choice between
them.What emerges fromBernstein’s rich andnuanced analysis is a visionofpragmatismas
a philosophy of communication and rational choice without foundations.This
vision is exemplified not only by the principle of a thoroughgoing fallibilism but also
and especially by a commitment to the open-endedness of the human conversation.
In the light of this basic vision of pragmatism, I wish to compare two contemporary
thinkers on the problem of moral disagreement: Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair
MacIntyre.Habermas andMacIntyre are among the most influential moral theorists
Corresponding author: Jason Hannan; e-mail: j.hannan@uwinnipeg.ca
Communication Theory 26 (2016) 21–40 © 2015 International Communication Association 21