Against this background, Kun Wang, Adolf Ng, Jasmine Siu Lee Lam and Xiaowen Fu develop a game theory model to investigate the factors and conditions affecting port governance in the region. On the basis of actual market data observed in 2010, their analytical model is calibrated to evaluate a possible alliance between Hong Kong and the port s of Shenzhen . The results of their analysis lead to a number of interesting conclusions. Most notably, that under certain conditions and in the absence of any regulatory barrier, conclusions. Most notably, that under certain conditions and in the absence of any regulatory barrier, ports in the South China cluster will be motivated to cooperate or form an alliance. The joint profit –maximizing behaviour of such an alliance would manifest itself as: (i) generally higher poth prices; (ii) a consequentially lower aggregate throughput,the level of which depends on the degree of substitutability of services between ports in the cluster; and (c) the distribution of throghput across the cluster to minimimze costs. If the anticipated or negotiated basis of this distribution of throughput is appropriately transfer payments is not precluded by regulation or for any other reason , then again the formation of an alliance will be attractive to all prospective members of the alliance. Where neither of these conditions is present, however, then there is little or no motivation for alliance formation.
We belive that the redership of this Special Issue of MEL will enjoy and benefit from our selection of the best papers oresented at the IAME 2011 conference.
Against this background, Kun Wang, Adolf Ng, Jasmine Siu Lee Lam and Xiaowen Fu develop a game theory model to investigate the factors and conditions affecting port governance in the region. On the basis of actual market data observed in 2010, their analytical model is calibrated to evaluate a possible alliance between Hong Kong and the port s of Shenzhen . The results of their analysis lead to a number of interesting conclusions. Most notably, that under certain conditions and in the absence of any regulatory barrier, conclusions. Most notably, that under certain conditions and in the absence of any regulatory barrier, ports in the South China cluster will be motivated to cooperate or form an alliance. The joint profit –maximizing behaviour of such an alliance would manifest itself as: (i) generally higher poth prices; (ii) a consequentially lower aggregate throughput,the level of which depends on the degree of substitutability of services between ports in the cluster; and (c) the distribution of throghput across the cluster to minimimze costs. If the anticipated or negotiated basis of this distribution of throughput is appropriately transfer payments is not precluded by regulation or for any other reason , then again the formation of an alliance will be attractive to all prospective members of the alliance. Where neither of these conditions is present, however, then there is little or no motivation for alliance formation.
We belive that the redership of this Special Issue of MEL will enjoy and benefit from our selection of the best papers oresented at the IAME 2011 conference.
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