independently of whether the entrepreneurs choose
to include it in a planning document. More generally
this finding is consistent with our conclusion
that business planning artifacts are not important
sources of information for venture decision makers.
This result is consistent with our other statistical
findings: the submission of planning documents
is, at best, a ceremonial act.
It is possible that if we had conducted this study
using a sample from an earlier period we might
have found different results. Producing a business
plan has become easier: business plan writing
is routinely taught in university courses, sample
business plans are readily available, and business
plan writing software has proliferated. Following
signaling theory, when the cost of producing a
business plan is low, its production is an unreliable
cue for would-be investors.
Our results may generalize to other settings of
high uncertainty, particularly when decision makers
must screen many possibilities in a limited
amount of time. For example, our results may be
applicable to bank lending decisions, as well as
screening efforts of angel investors. More broadly,
we suspect that ceremonial aspects of exchange
may be important when there is little basis to evaluate
consequences of a decision within a reasonable
amount of time and thereby rule out inefficient
behavior.
There are five important limitations to our study.
First, our theory is incomplete: additional cues
almost certainly exist. Second, our findings suggest
that characteristics of plans are learned through
alternative channels. These alternative channels
may be mediators who affect how the information
is interpreted. For example, information may
be viewed differently when received from a trusted
source. This would be problematic if some information
systematically came from such channels.
Third, the identified cues may be correlated with
unobservable characteristics of the business opportunities
or actions taken by the entrepreneur. For
example, entrepreneurial experience may be associated
with an understanding of the venture funding
process. If the best way to attain VC funding
is to get to know individuals in the VC community,
and experienced entrepreneurs are most aware
of this and best able to implement it, we might
still find a correlation between funding outcomes
and experience. But the interpretation of experience
as a cue would be erroneous; rather, it would
best be interpreted as a proxy for a particular type
independently of whether the entrepreneurs choose
to include it in a planning document. More generally
this finding is consistent with our conclusion
that business planning artifacts are not important
sources of information for venture decision makers.
This result is consistent with our other statistical
findings: the submission of planning documents
is, at best, a ceremonial act.
It is possible that if we had conducted this study
using a sample from an earlier period we might
have found different results. Producing a business
plan has become easier: business plan writing
is routinely taught in university courses, sample
business plans are readily available, and business
plan writing software has proliferated. Following
signaling theory, when the cost of producing a
business plan is low, its production is an unreliable
cue for would-be investors.
Our results may generalize to other settings of
high uncertainty, particularly when decision makers
must screen many possibilities in a limited
amount of time. For example, our results may be
applicable to bank lending decisions, as well as
screening efforts of angel investors. More broadly,
we suspect that ceremonial aspects of exchange
may be important when there is little basis to evaluate
consequences of a decision within a reasonable
amount of time and thereby rule out inefficient
behavior.
There are five important limitations to our study.
First, our theory is incomplete: additional cues
almost certainly exist. Second, our findings suggest
that characteristics of plans are learned through
alternative channels. These alternative channels
may be mediators who affect how the information
is interpreted. For example, information may
be viewed differently when received from a trusted
source. This would be problematic if some information
systematically came from such channels.
Third, the identified cues may be correlated with
unobservable characteristics of the business opportunities
or actions taken by the entrepreneur. For
example, entrepreneurial experience may be associated
with an understanding of the venture funding
process. If the best way to attain VC funding
is to get to know individuals in the VC community,
and experienced entrepreneurs are most aware
of this and best able to implement it, we might
still find a correlation between funding outcomes
and experience. But the interpretation of experience
as a cue would be erroneous; rather, it would
best be interpreted as a proxy for a particular type
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