American policy in Southeast Asia in the early years after the war was torn between promoting the independence of colonies from their European masters and recognizing the need to avoid undermining fragile European allies. At the same time its treatment of it own colony of the Philippines hardly served as an edifying model of how independence should be granted. The United States moved rapidly to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, but it did so on terms that were favourable to American economic interests. For example, American firms were granted ‘equal right’ with Filipinos in the exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Furthermore , American strategic interests were protected the following year by the Military Bases Agreement, by which the United States leased for ninety-nine years twenty-three bases with full jurisdiction. With regard to Indonesia, the United States took the view that the Dutch could not sustain their rule there by force, however successful they might be in the short term. Moreover , by late 1948 the United States was less concerned about the fragility of Holland itself. After the Indonesian Republicans had defeated the armed challenge of the radical and communist forces in Mediun in September 1948, the United States needed little persuasion to support the Indonesian nationalists. American pressure was successfully applied to persuade the Dutch to concede independence in 1949. In Indo-China, however, the United States did not put similar pressure on the French. The problem from an American perspective was that the effective nationalist resistance to the French was led by the communist Vietminh.