Interdisciplinary endeavors are fraught with terminological perils. This is especially true in the cognitive and computational sciences where, as Brian Cantwell Smith (forthcoming) points out, the same dozen or so words are used in a pro¬prietary way by each of the participating disciplines. This often leads to minor misunderstandings, but can also lead to more serious problems. Many of us can name books that are flawed at their core because authors in, say, philosophy assume that researchers from another field, say computer science, use a term in the same way that philosophers typically do.1 The issue for this paper, one that ought to trouble philosophers of information, is whether and to what extent the term ‘in¬formation’ maintains the same sense across disciplinary boundaries. In particular, I will focus on whether perceptual psychologists interested in information are talking about the same thing that logicians and theoretical computer scientists are talking about. That is, is the information picked up in perception the same thing as the information that is processed? It is not hard to see that the answer to this question opens an enormous can of worms in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, from the viability of computational models of perception to the very possibility of arti¬ficial intelligence. In this short paper I will mostly just open the can, leaving the untangling of worms to the reader.