11. The captain demonstrated poor cockpit oversight and piloting techniques before and
during the accident sequence.
12. Written company guidance on bounced landing recovery techniques would have
increased the possibility that the captain could have recovered from the bounced
landings or handled the airplane more appropriately by executing a go-around.
13. The performance of air carrier pilots would be improved if additional guidance and
training in bounced landing recovery techniques were available.
14. The aileron flight control surface position sensors installed on airplanes in accordance
with Supplemental Type Certificate No. ST01310NY are unreliable, and flight data
recorder functional checks every 6 months could ensure the timely identification and
correction of potentiometer malfunctions and ensure that accurate flight control data
are available for accident and incident investigations.
15. Because the first officer started getting treatment for anxiety in July 2001, he should
have reported this information on his last three Federal Aviation Administration
airman medical certificate applications.
16. Not enough evidence was available to determine whether or to what extent the first
officer’s medical condition and prescription drug use contributed to the accident.
17. The pitch control uncoupling mechanism uncoupled when the airplane touched down
for the third time; as a result, the pitch uncoupling would not have prevented the flight
crew from controlling or safely landing the airplane.
18. When the airplane touched down for the third time, the vertical forces on the left main
landing gear exceeded those that the gear was designed to withstand, and these
excessive forces resulted in overload failure.