Panel B of Table 2 presents results for the supervisory board. In both the average salary
equation and the total salary equation, the ownership concentration variable again has a negative
coefficient that is statistically significant. Greater ownership concentration leads to lower
compensation for SB members, confirming the hypothesis that lack of ownership control permits
greater personal rewards. Both ROE and Sales are positive and significant in the two regressions, indicating that better performance and larger size lead to greater compensation for
the members of the SB board. However, the Bank Influence variable is negative and not
significant in the average SB member salary equation and positive and significant at the 10%
level in the firm total SB salary equation. Since bankers sit on the SB they may have conflicting
motives regarding controlling compensation. Clearly bank influence is more important in
controlling compensation on the management board. In results not reported here, we have
substituted ROA for ROE and Assets or Employees for Sales. The results including these
variables were essentially the same as those reported here.