Minister meets with Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, Naypyitaw, Myanmar, Nov. 12, 2014 (Photo from the website of the Indian Prime Minister).
India, Thailand Taking Steps to Expand Ties
The Editors Wednesday, Aug. 12, 2015
Last month, India and Thailand signed a series of agreements, including a tax avoidance deal and extradition treaty. In an email interview, Pongphisoot Busbarat, a postdoctoral fellow at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asia Institute, discussed India-Thailand relations.
WPR: How extensive are Thailand’s economic ties with India, and what are the main areas of cooperation?
Pongphisoot Busbarat: Thailand’s economic ties with India are multilayered, based on bilateral, subregional and regional schemes. These arrangements were made possible by the complementarity of both countries’ foreign policy strategies since the early 1990s: India’s “Look East” policy and Thailand’s “Look West” policy.
The Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation was established in 1989. Recently other specialized platforms have been established, such as foreign office consultations, a defense dialogue and joint working groups. In 2003, a framework agreement to establish a free trade agreement (FTA) by 2010 was signed. Although tariffs on 83 products, mostly agricultural, were reduced immediately under an early harvest scheme, the full agreement is still under negotiation.
Several subregional initiatives were also launched by Thailand in the second half of 1990s, notably, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation in 1997 and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in 2000. These initiatives aim to enhance economic linkages between South and Southeast Asia.
Apart from these, India and Thailand are also actively involved in other regional organizations. These include an ASEAN Dialogue Partnership, the ASEAN-India FTA, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Despite the rapid growth of the Indian economy and extensive relations in other areas, the degree of economic ties between India and Thailand is relatively modest. Although bilateral trade reached nearly $9 billion in 2014, trade with India accounts for just under 2 percent of Thailand’s total trade. This is mainly due to the similar structure of production that creates competition rather than complementarity. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also growing slowly. Thailand’s accumulated investment in India between 2012-2014 is approximately $96 million and makes up only 6 percent of India’s inward FDI. India invested around $313 million in Thailand from 2012-2014, mostly in metals and machineries, chemicals, paper, plastic, and the mineral and ceramic industries.
WPR: What role does military cooperation play in Thailand-India relations?
Busbarat: Military relations traditionally focused on naval cooperation, especially joint patrols due to their common border in the Andaman Sea. However, military cooperation has expanded to reflect India’s security concerns and mutual challenges in the post-Cold War period. In fact, security cooperation was a crucial prelude to the new chapter of Indian-Thai relations we see today.
Particularly, since the 1980s, India has been concerned with anti-government militia groups, particularly, the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, and their links to Thailand. New Delhi believes that they have used Thailand as a safe haven and for arms smuggling due to the latter’s relaxed border policy. To address this threat, India requested the creation of a separate mechanism to address security issues.
This request led to the establishment of the Thailand-India Joint Working Group on Security Cooperation (JWG) in 2001. The JWG has focused on the exchange of intelligence, maritime security, counterterrorism, the fight against transnational crimes and related legal frameworks, including an extradition treaty and money-laundering agreement.
New Delhi’s request was part of a diplomatic quid pro quo during the administration of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from 2001-2006, who wanted to negotiate an FTA with India. The JWG has become not only an overarching bilateral security platform, but also a stepping-stone toward more expansive relations.
WPR: What effect has the military junta taking power in Thailand had on relations with India?
Busbarat: In a nutshell, military rule in Thailand has a marginal effect on Indian-Thai relations. India’s position toward the coup since May 2014 is in line with other Asian governments. It has been cautious and sympathetic, and avoided criticizing, despite India’s standing as the world’s largest democracy. Notwithstanding its expectation to see democracy restored in Thailand, the Indian government expressed that it did not want bilateral relations to be affected by Thailand’s internal political transition.
As neighboring countries, there are more immediate issues and concerns that require uninterrupted communication between India and Thailand. Although India recalled soldiers scheduled to participate in the Maitree joint military exercise in Thailand in May 2014, it was characterized not as a sign of disapproval of the coup, but rather as an effort to comply with the government’s travel and security warnings for Indian citizens.
รัฐมนตรีตรงกับกับพ.ต.ท.ประยุทธกันจันทร์-o-ชะอำ เนปิตาว พม่า 12 พฤศจิกายน 2014 (ภาพจากเว็บไซต์ของนายกรัฐมนตรีของอินเดีย)ทำตามขั้นตอนการขยายความสัมพันธ์ไทย อินเดียบรรณาธิการวันพุธ 12 ส.ค. 2015เดือน อินเดียและไทยเซ็นชุดของข้อตกลง รวมภาษีหลีกเลี่ยงส่งผู้ร้ายข้ามแดนและข้อตกลงสนธิสัญญา ในอีเมล์ Pongphisoot Busbarat เพื่อนนักที่มหาวิทยาลัยโคลัมเบีย Weatherhead เอเชียตะวันออก สถาบัน กล่าวถึงความสัมพันธ์ไทย-อินเดียWPR: อย่างละเอียดว่ามีความสัมพันธ์ทางเศรษฐกิจของประเทศไทยกับอินเดีย และด้านความร่วมมือหลักคืออะไรPongphisoot Busbarat: ความสัมพันธ์ทางเศรษฐกิจของประเทศไทยกับอินเดียได้ multilayered ตามแผนงานทวิภาคี subregional และภูมิภาค บริการเหล่านี้ได้ทำไป โดย complementarity กลยุทธ์นโยบายต่างประเทศของทั้งสองประเทศตั้งแต่ช่วงต้นทศวรรษ 1990: นโยบาย "มองตะวันออก" ของอินเดียและนโยบาย "มองตะวันตก" ของประเทศไทยเสริมความร่วมมือทวิภาคีร่วมกันก่อตั้งขึ้นในปี 1989 ล่าสุด แพลตฟอร์มอื่น ๆ เฉพาะได้ถูกก่อตั้ง ให้คำปรึกษากับสำนักงานต่างประเทศ ป้องกันการพูดคุยกัน และกลุ่มทำงานร่วมกัน กรอบข้อตกลงการสร้างข้อตกลงการค้าเสรี (เขตการค้าเสรี) 2010 ถูกเซ็นชื่อใน 2003 แม้ว่าภาษีศุลกากรในสินค้า 83 เกษตรส่วนใหญ่ ถูกลดลงทันทีภายใต้แผนการเก็บเกี่ยวต้น ข้อตกลงทั้งหมดจะยังคงอยู่ระหว่างการเจรจาSeveral subregional initiatives were also launched by Thailand in the second half of 1990s, notably, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation in 1997 and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation in 2000. These initiatives aim to enhance economic linkages between South and Southeast Asia.Apart from these, India and Thailand are also actively involved in other regional organizations. These include an ASEAN Dialogue Partnership, the ASEAN-India FTA, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.Despite the rapid growth of the Indian economy and extensive relations in other areas, the degree of economic ties between India and Thailand is relatively modest. Although bilateral trade reached nearly $9 billion in 2014, trade with India accounts for just under 2 percent of Thailand’s total trade. This is mainly due to the similar structure of production that creates competition rather than complementarity. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also growing slowly. Thailand’s accumulated investment in India between 2012-2014 is approximately $96 million and makes up only 6 percent of India’s inward FDI. India invested around $313 million in Thailand from 2012-2014, mostly in metals and machineries, chemicals, paper, plastic, and the mineral and ceramic industries.WPR: What role does military cooperation play in Thailand-India relations?Busbarat: Military relations traditionally focused on naval cooperation, especially joint patrols due to their common border in the Andaman Sea. However, military cooperation has expanded to reflect India’s security concerns and mutual challenges in the post-Cold War period. In fact, security cooperation was a crucial prelude to the new chapter of Indian-Thai relations we see today. Particularly, since the 1980s, India has been concerned with anti-government militia groups, particularly, the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, and their links to Thailand. New Delhi believes that they have used Thailand as a safe haven and for arms smuggling due to the latter’s relaxed border policy. To address this threat, India requested the creation of a separate mechanism to address security issues. This request led to the establishment of the Thailand-India Joint Working Group on Security Cooperation (JWG) in 2001. The JWG has focused on the exchange of intelligence, maritime security, counterterrorism, the fight against transnational crimes and related legal frameworks, including an extradition treaty and money-laundering agreement. New Delhi’s request was part of a diplomatic quid pro quo during the administration of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from 2001-2006, who wanted to negotiate an FTA with India. The JWG has become not only an overarching bilateral security platform, but also a stepping-stone toward more expansive relations.WPR: What effect has the military junta taking power in Thailand had on relations with India?Busbarat: In a nutshell, military rule in Thailand has a marginal effect on Indian-Thai relations. India’s position toward the coup since May 2014 is in line with other Asian governments. It has been cautious and sympathetic, and avoided criticizing, despite India’s standing as the world’s largest democracy. Notwithstanding its expectation to see democracy restored in Thailand, the Indian government expressed that it did not want bilateral relations to be affected by Thailand’s internal political transition. As neighboring countries, there are more immediate issues and concerns that require uninterrupted communication between India and Thailand. Although India recalled soldiers scheduled to participate in the Maitree joint military exercise in Thailand in May 2014, it was characterized not as a sign of disapproval of the coup, but rather as an effort to comply with the government’s travel and security warnings for Indian citizens.
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