There are two effects of a higher R. The first, direct effect is to raise the expected payoff and thus increase the amount that the investor is willing to put into the firm. Holding the level of stealing constant, the direct effect shows that the value of the firm rises. The second, indirect effect works because higher returns from investmThe first term is positive. The second term contains ∂π/∂k, which is negative. A higher value of k (i.e., a weaker legal environment) implies that (∂π/∂R)/ π increases, so that the value of the firm, π, becomes more sensitive in percentage terms to a change in the rate of return, R. The same result holds if we allow firms to borrow debt as well as issue equity. However, the presence of debt implies a range of values for R within which a lower value of R actually means less stealing because the manager steals less (or even transfers funds into the firm if that is possible) in order to enable the firm to service its debt and therefore preserve the possibility of future stealing. If R falls sufficiently low, however, then the manager will choose to loot the firm and it will go out of existence. In the data, therefore, we will look at percentage changes in firms' values.ent reduce the optimal level of stealing, so ∂S*/∂R < 0
Lower stealing also raises the expected payoff for outside investors and increases the value of the firm.2
What is the effect ∂ π/∂R of changing the penalty for managerial theft, k?
The effect on the absolute responsiveness is
∂ρa/∂Rα - 1
For low values of α R, such that Rα0.
This effect is positive regardless of the value of α. Note that the relation between absolute and relative responsiveness is
∂(ρa)/∂k = ∂ (π ρr)/∂k = π[∂ρr/ ∂k] + [∂π/∂k] (ρr)