In 1946, the Philippines won its independence and established a democratic constitutional republic modeled after the United States. Yet the system of elites and political favors remained. How were oligarchic power and patrimonial practices sustained even with the creation of a democratic national government
The creation of a national state merely expanded and centralized the opportunities for patrimonial practices. Pre-1946, when land in the Philippines was divided into feudalistic haciendas, resources for kinship distribution had been derived from the land. However, as the nation-state and government were established, resources could be derived from state capacities (such as tax collection, enactment of large-scale industries, manufacturing). A modernized state also brings with it enterprises beyond feudalist agricultural activities, including commerce, manufacturing, and finance that made “access to the state machinery more important than ever for the creation of wealth”.
One sees this pattern with the Philippines’ oligarchy, which controls both economics and politics. Under Oeschlin’s theory the Philippines should enforce elite-protecting policies that reduce aggregate savings, prevent competition, and concentrate wealth unevenly. Indeed, distributional policies over time have been largely to the benefit of oligarchs. There were monopolies, tax breaks, and subsidies characterizing oligarchic agricultural industries. Land reform efforts were neither substantial nor enforced. In the 1970s, Ferdinand Marcos claimed he would create a “New Society” by breaking up traditional haciendas and redistributing them to the tenant workers. However, only 8% of five million landless peasants were eligible for land redistribution acts and the largest industries, sugar and coconut (which employed 1/3 of all Filipinos), were exempt (Zich 123). Additionally, despite GNP indicators of growth, the majority of people did not see these benefits. During Marcos regime, growth was measured at 6% (Muego 227). Yet, minimum wage for urban workers remained at 11 pesos, while commodity prices increased (Muego 228). Thus, workers were essentially at subsistence levels and prevented from accumulating enough savings that would allow them to engage in entrepreneurial activities or see investment returns.
The historical oligarchy in the Philippines’s history was a burden on the development of democracy. Since political leaders require vast reserves of wealth to participate in elections, only the rich can run for office. Therefore, the Philippines’ elite retain and rotate political power because patrimonial practices are extended to electoral systems. To illustrate, in the 1960s, national election candidates’ expenditures were equivalent to 13% of the budget (the highest ratio of campaign cost to budget in the world at the time) and half of all campaign expenses were payments to local groups, individuals, and leaders (Wurfel 764). This vast spending indicates the wealth required to be a viable candidate, and also the patrimonial manner in which it is spent. Also, there have been negligible efforts in meaningful campaign reform. For example, the Republic Act No. 7166 in 1991 was meant to curb campaign expenditures. Candidates are supposed to spend maximum 10 pesos for every voter. According to Pera’t Pulitika, an election monitoring group in the Philippines, in 2007 it cost five billion pesos to finance a campaign, vastly exceeding what the Act’s limit states should be about 450 million. It was also roughly 3% of the GDP in 2007. In addition, there are no laws restricting the amount of campaign contributions, thereby giving wealthy special interests an advantage in producing a candidate. Thus, the wealthy oligarchy assumed and reinforced political control because of already existing perceptions as leaders and also with political practices that required vast sums of money to campaign with and distribute to supporters.
Another effect that patrimonialism has on governance is inconsistency. Government jobs are another source of patrimony, and these will shift as new presidents are elected. Balicasan states that the ‘personal