Introduction: Concepts and Theories in Politics 11
a political scientist may examine the democratic processes at work within a
particular system, a political philosopher will be interested in clarifying
what is meant by ‘democracy’. Political philosophy therefore addresses
itself to two main tasks. First, it is concerned with the critical evaluation of
political beliefs, paying attention to both inductive and deductive forms of
reasoning. Secondly, it attempts to clarify and refine the concepts
employed in political discourse. What this means is that, despite the best
efforts of political philosophers to remain impartial and objective, they are
inevitably concerned with justifying certain political viewpoints at the
expense of others and with upholding a particular understanding of a
concept rather than alternative ones. From this point of view, the present
book can be seen primarily as a work of political theory and not political
philosophy. Although the writings of political philosophers provide much
of its material, its objective is to analyse and explain political ideas and
concepts rather than advance any particular beliefs or interpretations.
Political theory in the twenty-first century
Political theory was in a beleaguered state through much of the twentieth
century. Indeed, in his introduction to Philosophy, Politics and Society
(1956) Peter Laslett famously declared that ‘political philosophy is dead’.
Its ‘death’ was largely a consequence of important shifts in philosophy,
notably the rise of logical positivism. Logical positivism, originally
advanced by a group of philosophers collectively known as the Vienna
Circle, reflected a deep faith in scientific understanding and suggested that
propositions that are not empirically verifiable are simply meaningless.
Normative concepts such as ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ were
therefore discarded as nonsense, and philosophers, as a result, tended to
lose interest in moral and political issues. For their part, political scientists,
influenced by the ‘behavioural revolution’ that was one of the chief legacies
of positivism, turned their backs upon the entire tradition of normative
political thought. This meant, for instance, that words such as ‘democracy’
were redefined in terms of measurable political behaviour.
After the 1960s, however, political theory re-emerged with new vitality,
and the previously sharp distinction between political science and political
theory began to fade. This occurred for a number of reasons. These
included a growing dissatisfaction with behaviouralism, based upon its
tendency to constrain the scope of political analysis by preventing it from
going beyond what is directly observable. Moreover, faith in the ability of
science to uncover objective truth was undermined by advances in the
philosophy of science, stemming in particular from the work of Thomas