simulations to explore idea diffusion, and a case study of US and Japanese
citizens’ views of the rise of China. From his experiments with US subjects,
Rousseau finds that a sense of shared identity was negatively correlated with
threat perception. He also confirms that perceptions of shared identity and
threat were manipulable and that these manipulations altered the willingness of
subjects to cooperate with China. Rousseau’s computer simulation involves a
population of ‘‘agents’’ interacting in a domestic society or ‘‘landscape’’; we can
think of each agent as a person and the landscape as a domestic society. The
agents possess beliefs and values that are modified through interaction with
other agents, creating a structure that subsequently constrains and shapes the
actions of individual agents. Based on different iterations and tests of the simulation,
Rousseau finds that the greater the number of identity dimensions in an
actor’s repertoire, the less likely that actor is to identify completely (positively or
negatively) with the ‘‘other.’’ Furthermore, a unified political elite can shape
mass opinion whereas a deeply split political elite will trigger a polarization at
the mass level. He further shows that media channels have a powerful impact on
the emergence of a shared identity.
No doubt anticipating skepticism about results based solely on a computer
simulation and laboratory experiments involving college undergraduates, Rousseau
adds a comparative case study of US and Japanese attitudes toward China.
Rousseau’s analysis of these perceptions produces some empirical support for
realism and liberalism, but in so doing it confirms the power of his constructivist
argument. He notes that, in contrast to realist predictions, China has not aggressively
balanced against the United States, nor has Japan balanced against China
(or against the United States for that matter) despite China’s rising military and
economic power. Nor, he continues, has the United States moved to contain a
rising China, preferring a liberal engagement strategy. In the realm of public
opinion, on which his overall model concentrates, data indicate that the perception
of a Chinese threat has grown in the United States, but they also suggest
that this perception is related to a change in the perception of identity rather
than a change in the perception of power. Rousseau claims that his findings corroborate
the computer simulation by demonstrating that media concentration
and elite polarization explain the relative consensus in Japan and the deep split
in opinion within the United States regarding the Chinese threat.
Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities is a good and important book.
Of course, suggesting that threats are subjective or variable is not a new idea.
These themes have been the subject of analyses for decades in the areas of
images and perceptions. But Rousseau’s systematic critique of the major paradigms
on threat perception and his methodical elaboration of the processes of
identity formation add new insights and inspiration for theorizing about how
such images and perceptions might originate and change.
Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities also contains some minor infractions
and questionable aspects that will induce skepticism. Rousseau’s use of experimentation,
subject pools of college undergraduates, and computer simulations
to test the model will raise the usual concerns about validity. Moreover, as a
study of public attitudes, its relevance depends on the significance of public
opinion to foreign policymaking, a highly debatable assertion. Finally, as an ideational
theory of subjectivity, it is not clear what role material factors might play,
and what is or is not interpretation. At one point, Rousseau concedes that
‘‘threatening behavior by the other state,’’ which he operationalizes in terms of
such statements as ‘‘it attacks common neighbors’’ and ‘‘it attacks you,’’ can
‘‘lead to an erosion of the sense of shared identity’’ (p. 65). However, this language
belies his thesis because it suggests that the use of force is obviously and
universally ‘‘threatening behavior.’’ The point appears to be that what an attack
is depends on theoretical assumptions. Some actors may welcome an attack on