Second, government actors increasingly seek to compensate
people for collectively felt harm. Class action attorneys, regulatory
agencies, state attorneys general, and criminal prosecutors commence
actions seeking the same funds against the same defendant, for the
same conduct, and on behalf of the same set of victims. Commenta-
tors have largely ignored how the convergence of these legal regimes
may inform or alter the responsibilities of public actors to provide
compensatory justice to private parties. Who acts as a check against
indifference or conflicts of interest? How do we assure transparency
when disseminating information about such settlements? Who de-
cides an appropriate way to allocate and distribute settlement
proceeds? Only by examining such questions can we shed light on the
state’s ability to provide procedural, distributive, and corrective justice
to victims of collective harm.
This Article has explored the specific questions and concerns that
arise when prosecutors mimic class actions by collecting large mone-
tary settlements on behalf of victims. While many scholars have ex-
plored the way that private class actions complement public goals of
“deterrence,” few have explored the opposite: ways that public set-
tlements complement private goals of compensation. Currently, pros-
ecutors afford comparatively few procedural protections to the victims
they compensate. There are good reasons for prosecutors to continue
to play a role—albeit a limited one—in compensating victims. When
they do so, however, prosecutors should adopt procedures from pri-
vate litigation to assure victims more voice, representation, consisten-
cy, and justice in their own redress.