Consider Figure 1 which shows the trends in the crude divorce rate for selected countries. Before
proceeding to a discussion of these trends, it is important to understand what these numbers tell
us. The crude divorce rate shows the number of divorces per 1,000 individuals in the population.
It is not a perfect measure of underlying marital instability and, particularly, does not tell how
many couples eventually divorce (Preston & McDonald, 1979; Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006).
Crude rates are known to fluctuate over time and a sudden increase, for example, can indicate
that many couples divorce sooner than they otherwise would have. As it is not adjusted for the
number of married couples, the crude rate can also be affected by changes in the popularity of
marriage. Despite these limitations, the crude divorce rate correlates strongly with better
measures (Amato, 2010). It is available for long time periods and for several countries and is
thus suitable for describing long-term cross-national trends.
Divorce rates were higher in all the countries represented in Fig 1 at the beginning of the
new millennium than just after the First World War. Yet there are major cross-national
differences. The United States has traditionally been a high divorce society, whereas in Spain
divorce was not possible until 1981. The 1960s saw the beginning of a sharp increase in divorce
6
rates in many countries, but they have stabilized or even decreased since. In others, such as Spain
and Turkey, the increase began later. In Japan, divorce was more common at the beginning of the
20th century than midcentury (Goode, 1963). Finally, the figure shows the temporal fluctuation
in the crude divorce rate: it has spiked after the Second World War (Pavalko & Elder, 1990) and
after major liberalizations in divorce legislation.
Despite the limitations of the crude divorce rate measure, its overall trend corresponds
with a long-term increase in marital instability at the individual level. Approximately every fifth
American marriage contracted in the 1950s had ended in divorce by 25 years after the wedding,
whereas about a half of all couples who married in the 1970s or later are expected to divorce
(Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). Increasing numbers of children
have experienced the split-up of their parents and the simultaneous increases in divorce and
declines in mortality has meant that family dissolution has replaced parental death as the leading
cause for single parenthood (e.g., Bygren, Gähler & Nermo, 2004).
What accounts for these trends and cross-national variations? As a first step in explaining
social change, demographers distinguish between cohort effects and period effects. Cohort
effects refer to differences between groups of people who shared a critical experience during the
same time interval (Alwin & McCammon, 2003). Cohort is often used as a short hand for birth
cohort, but demographers use it in a more general sense. Divorce researchers talk about marriage
cohorts when refering to those marrying during the same year. Marriage cohort effects arise
when the conditions surrounding the beginning of the marital journey shape couples‘ marital
expectations and behaviors throughout their marriages (e.g., Preston & McDonald, 1979). Cohort
effects are responsible for divorce trends to the extent that new marriage cohorts with new
attitudes and practices replace earlier ones.
7
Period effects, in turn, refer to influences which (at least potentially) affect all marriages,
regardless of when the couples married; they are ‗something in the air‘ (Cherlin, 1992). They
include economic recessions, legal reforms, and cultural trends. Since period effects include not
only gradually evolving social trends but also abrupt shifts such as changes in divorce laws, they
have more potential to cause sudden increases or decreases in divorce. Divorce researchers
generally agree that period effects dominate over cohort effects (Thornton & Rodgers, 1987;
Cherlin, 1992; Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010). Therefore, to understand divorce trends, we must
look into factors that at least potentially affect all marriages.
The initial increases in divorce took social scientists by surprise (Cherlin, 1992) and even
now, there is no single explanation of why divorce rates have increased, or vary cross-nationally.
Suggested explanations range from economic trends to cultural shifts and legal changes. Many
explanations point to the change in gender roles—from gender asymmetry to increasing gender
symmetry and equality—and, in particular, to the dramatic increases in married women‘s labour
market activity. Indeed, the trends in female employment and in divorce rates have closely
followed one another (Cherlin, 1992; Ruggles, 1997) and a positive relationship between the two
is also visible across countries (Kalmijn, 2007). Most researchers have interpreted the causality
to run from female employment to divorce. A problem with this interpretation is that, as will be
discussed in the next section, the micro-level evidence regarding this link is not conclusive
(Özcan & Breen, 2012). Other economic explanations have focused on the relative deterioration
of men‘s economic fortunes in many countries, but neither of these can explain the big picture
(Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007).
Other theories emphasize cultural changes (e.g., Lesthaeghe, 1995; Coontz, 2005;
Cherlin, 2009). A popular account is provided by the second demographic transition thesis
8
(Lesthaeghe, 1995), which links the changes in family behaviour to the increases in
individualism and other postmaterial values. There has been a shift in family attitudes towards
more gender equality, personal fulfillment, and acceptance of non-traditional family behaviours,
such as divorce (Thornton & Young-De Marco, 2001). This shift has been very uneven across
the Western world and major cross-national variation in the acceptance of divorce remains
(Gelissen, 2003).
These new ideas fit squarely with traditional views of marriage and family life which
were based on rigid roles and sharp gender inequalities, and emphasized the married couple as a
single unit, rather than a partnership of two individuals (Coontz, 2005). However, as with
explanations having to do with attitudes more generally, there is a chicken-and-egg problem of
which came first, attitudes or behaviour? Divorce attitudes often seemed to adjust to changing
realities instead of providing the initial push to increased divorce (even though liberalized
attitudes may have made later divorces easier and more common) (Cherlin, 1992). More
generally, testing these explanations is often difficult and constrained by the availability of
relevant cross-national data over long periods of time. Some scholars have used religiosity as a
measure of cultural acceptance of divorce and found secularization to correlate positively with
divorce rates (e.g., Kalmijn, 2010). In an interesting study in Brazil, Chong and La Ferrera
(2009) found that the spread of telenovelas in that country was followed by increases in divorce,
presumably as couples become increasingly exposed to new ideas about family life. Even though
the explanatory power of cultural influences on divorce is difficult to assess, the spread of new
ideas and attitudes is likely to have contributed to the increases in family instability.
Divorce laws have changed markedly through the 20th century and the beginning of the
21st
. Divorce was prohibited until recently in several Western countries (for example, Italy
9
legalized divorce in 1974, Spain in 1981, Ireland in 1997, and Malta in 2011) and is difficult to
obtain in others. Often, divorces could be granted on the basis of serious fault (such as adultery,
violence, or mental illness) or possibly, by the mutual consent of the spouses (Härkönen &
Dronkers, 2006). Even then, the process was usually expensive and lengthy. Major liberalization
of divorce laws began in the sixties and seventies, and in 1970, California was the first state to
implement unilateral ‗no fault‘ divorce, in which either spouse could exit the marriage without
having to provide specific reasons. Sweden followed suit in 1974, and by the turn of the
millennium, most Western countries had liberalized their divorce legislation (Gonzalez &
Viitanen, 2009).
Do these legislative changes affect divorce rates, or do they merely reflect the rising
acceptance of and demand for divorce? Recent research has generally concluded that
liberalization of divorce laws did cause short-term spikes in divorce rates (see, for example,
Sweden in 1974 in Figure 1), presumably as spouses in ill-functioning marriages took advantage
of the better opportunities for exiting their marriages (Wolfers, 2006; Stevenson & Wolfers,
2007; González & Viitanen, 2009). According to many, these effects were not lasting and the
long-term effect of the liberalization of divorce laws was, at most, a small increase in divorce
rates (however, see González & Viitanen, 2009). Loosening of official control over marriages
and divorces did, however, change the divorce process and the dynamics of marriages. Unilateral
divorce—the possibility of exiting a marriage without the consent of one‘s spouse—shifted the
power balance to the spouse more willing to exit, while the shortening of the legal process and
the weakening need to show fault or ―irreconcilability‖ have made divorce processes faster and
possibly less conflict-ridden (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007).
10
All in all, social scientists have had difficulties in explaning the increases in divorce. All
available explanations have limitations. An interpretation of the trends is that values have
changed and reorientations provide the social opportunities and subjective motives for divorce,
whereas changes in women‘s economic independence has been among the factors providing the
means for doing so (Cherlin, 2009). Together, these changes meant that people were more
Consider Figure 1 which shows the trends in the crude divorce rate for selected countries. Beforeproceeding to a discussion of these trends, it is important to understand what these numbers tellus. The crude divorce rate shows the number of divorces per 1,000 individuals in the population.It is not a perfect measure of underlying marital instability and, particularly, does not tell howmany couples eventually divorce (Preston & McDonald, 1979; Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006).Crude rates are known to fluctuate over time and a sudden increase, for example, can indicatethat many couples divorce sooner than they otherwise would have. As it is not adjusted for thenumber of married couples, the crude rate can also be affected by changes in the popularity ofmarriage. Despite these limitations, the crude divorce rate correlates strongly with bettermeasures (Amato, 2010). It is available for long time periods and for several countries and isthus suitable for describing long-term cross-national trends.Divorce rates were higher in all the countries represented in Fig 1 at the beginning of thenew millennium than just after the First World War. Yet there are major cross-nationaldifferences. The United States has traditionally been a high divorce society, whereas in Spaindivorce was not possible until 1981. The 1960s saw the beginning of a sharp increase in divorce 6rates in many countries, but they have stabilized or even decreased since. In others, such as Spainand Turkey, the increase began later. In Japan, divorce was more common at the beginning of the20th century than midcentury (Goode, 1963). Finally, the figure shows the temporal fluctuationin the crude divorce rate: it has spiked after the Second World War (Pavalko & Elder, 1990) andafter major liberalizations in divorce legislation.Despite the limitations of the crude divorce rate measure, its overall trend correspondswith a long-term increase in marital instability at the individual level. Approximately every fifthAmerican marriage contracted in the 1950s had ended in divorce by 25 years after the wedding,whereas about a half of all couples who married in the 1970s or later are expected to divorce(Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). Increasing numbers of childrenhave experienced the split-up of their parents and the simultaneous increases in divorce anddeclines in mortality has meant that family dissolution has replaced parental death as the leadingcause for single parenthood (e.g., Bygren, Gähler & Nermo, 2004).What accounts for these trends and cross-national variations? As a first step in explainingsocial change, demographers distinguish between cohort effects and period effects. Cohorteffects refer to differences between groups of people who shared a critical experience during thesame time interval (Alwin & McCammon, 2003). Cohort is often used as a short hand for birthcohort, but demographers use it in a more general sense. Divorce researchers talk about marriagecohorts when refering to those marrying during the same year. Marriage cohort effects arisewhen the conditions surrounding the beginning of the marital journey shape couples‘ maritalexpectations and behaviors throughout their marriages (e.g., Preston & McDonald, 1979). Cohorteffects are responsible for divorce trends to the extent that new marriage cohorts with newattitudes and practices replace earlier ones. 7Period effects, in turn, refer to influences which (at least potentially) affect all marriages,regardless of when the couples married; they are ‗something in the air‘ (Cherlin, 1992). Theyinclude economic recessions, legal reforms, and cultural trends. Since period effects include notonly gradually evolving social trends but also abrupt shifts such as changes in divorce laws, theyhave more potential to cause sudden increases or decreases in divorce. Divorce researchersgenerally agree that period effects dominate over cohort effects (Thornton & Rodgers, 1987;Cherlin, 1992; Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010). Therefore, to understand divorce trends, we mustlook into factors that at least potentially affect all marriages.The initial increases in divorce took social scientists by surprise (Cherlin, 1992) and evennow, there is no single explanation of why divorce rates have increased, or vary cross-nationally.Suggested explanations range from economic trends to cultural shifts and legal changes. Many
explanations point to the change in gender roles—from gender asymmetry to increasing gender
symmetry and equality—and, in particular, to the dramatic increases in married women‘s labour
market activity. Indeed, the trends in female employment and in divorce rates have closely
followed one another (Cherlin, 1992; Ruggles, 1997) and a positive relationship between the two
is also visible across countries (Kalmijn, 2007). Most researchers have interpreted the causality
to run from female employment to divorce. A problem with this interpretation is that, as will be
discussed in the next section, the micro-level evidence regarding this link is not conclusive
(Özcan & Breen, 2012). Other economic explanations have focused on the relative deterioration
of men‘s economic fortunes in many countries, but neither of these can explain the big picture
(Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007).
Other theories emphasize cultural changes (e.g., Lesthaeghe, 1995; Coontz, 2005;
Cherlin, 2009). A popular account is provided by the second demographic transition thesis
8
(Lesthaeghe, 1995), which links the changes in family behaviour to the increases in
individualism and other postmaterial values. There has been a shift in family attitudes towards
more gender equality, personal fulfillment, and acceptance of non-traditional family behaviours,
such as divorce (Thornton & Young-De Marco, 2001). This shift has been very uneven across
the Western world and major cross-national variation in the acceptance of divorce remains
(Gelissen, 2003).
These new ideas fit squarely with traditional views of marriage and family life which
were based on rigid roles and sharp gender inequalities, and emphasized the married couple as a
single unit, rather than a partnership of two individuals (Coontz, 2005). However, as with
explanations having to do with attitudes more generally, there is a chicken-and-egg problem of
which came first, attitudes or behaviour? Divorce attitudes often seemed to adjust to changing
realities instead of providing the initial push to increased divorce (even though liberalized
attitudes may have made later divorces easier and more common) (Cherlin, 1992). More
generally, testing these explanations is often difficult and constrained by the availability of
relevant cross-national data over long periods of time. Some scholars have used religiosity as a
measure of cultural acceptance of divorce and found secularization to correlate positively with
divorce rates (e.g., Kalmijn, 2010). In an interesting study in Brazil, Chong and La Ferrera
(2009) found that the spread of telenovelas in that country was followed by increases in divorce,
presumably as couples become increasingly exposed to new ideas about family life. Even though
the explanatory power of cultural influences on divorce is difficult to assess, the spread of new
ideas and attitudes is likely to have contributed to the increases in family instability.
Divorce laws have changed markedly through the 20th century and the beginning of the
21st
. Divorce was prohibited until recently in several Western countries (for example, Italy
9
legalized divorce in 1974, Spain in 1981, Ireland in 1997, and Malta in 2011) and is difficult to
obtain in others. Often, divorces could be granted on the basis of serious fault (such as adultery,
violence, or mental illness) or possibly, by the mutual consent of the spouses (Härkönen &
Dronkers, 2006). Even then, the process was usually expensive and lengthy. Major liberalization
of divorce laws began in the sixties and seventies, and in 1970, California was the first state to
implement unilateral ‗no fault‘ divorce, in which either spouse could exit the marriage without
having to provide specific reasons. Sweden followed suit in 1974, and by the turn of the
millennium, most Western countries had liberalized their divorce legislation (Gonzalez &
Viitanen, 2009).
Do these legislative changes affect divorce rates, or do they merely reflect the rising
acceptance of and demand for divorce? Recent research has generally concluded that
liberalization of divorce laws did cause short-term spikes in divorce rates (see, for example,
Sweden in 1974 in Figure 1), presumably as spouses in ill-functioning marriages took advantage
of the better opportunities for exiting their marriages (Wolfers, 2006; Stevenson & Wolfers,
2007; González & Viitanen, 2009). According to many, these effects were not lasting and the
long-term effect of the liberalization of divorce laws was, at most, a small increase in divorce
rates (however, see González & Viitanen, 2009). Loosening of official control over marriages
and divorces did, however, change the divorce process and the dynamics of marriages. Unilateral
divorce—the possibility of exiting a marriage without the consent of one‘s spouse—shifted the
power balance to the spouse more willing to exit, while the shortening of the legal process and
the weakening need to show fault or ―irreconcilability‖ have made divorce processes faster and
possibly less conflict-ridden (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007).
10
All in all, social scientists have had difficulties in explaning the increases in divorce. All
available explanations have limitations. An interpretation of the trends is that values have
changed and reorientations provide the social opportunities and subjective motives for divorce,
whereas changes in women‘s economic independence has been among the factors providing the
means for doing so (Cherlin, 2009). Together, these changes meant that people were more
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